Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5da95d5565078f6c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

51.1 KB Created: 2020-09-03 00:44:10 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: f85c66d43302a98ffb9633d510cda096 SHA-1: 90070ebf117388292f175959dc4b55f721e54453 SHA-256: 5da95d5565078f6c15aad69370f1d5550277bde5c1a9e07cd1dd5313285359de
234 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The PDF contains a lure instructing the user to copy and paste content into a command-line interface, specifically mentioning 'cmd' and 'attrib'. This suggests an attempt to trick the user into executing malicious commands, likely to download and run a secondary payload from the provided URL. The document also contains a large number of links to other PDFs, indicating a potential SEO poisoning or link farm strategy.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/wix?keyword=how+to+format+usb+using+cmd+attrib
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9580/2527/files/38456646175.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/9975/8497/files/zizutidefebamofetu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/8286/5047/files/tusizotoxivewowixo.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/5d2cf3_2132af1dcb4041239f2b39f9cff992a2.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/1a89c8_489f73486df9485cb9ecbe1a35f63c2e.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b4a829_4fe22e3894424b3fbfa046232af2ae5f.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/510691_42473cc80c05405e94e4c386fbdd7134.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/aef5b7_4333b3a335624e7daab5afc149e1f260.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/9394/0641/files/5790869797.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0443/3425/2188/files/makkar_ielts_speaking_may_to_august_2020.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/3317/3927/files/adestramento_inteligente_gratis.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/2480/9122/files/68912144821.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/8932/1366/files/21001370981.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/4691/8551/files/agile_certified_practitioner.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/6277/2380/files/28384468000.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/4145/4240/files/91410629695.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0461/7099/6889/files/jiwore.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000088d2.bin
4262df67aed2ae337ab29cd19c075de7aed581659bb9c6859e9e5468dea8508b		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x88D2 5504 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00009b80.bin
ba0610f747892d9a947ae385c2ab4351bf89f00710569bcd40f1da68815e06c9		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9B80 10572 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.