Hancitor — Office (OLE) / .DOC malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5da3261145ee7597…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

342.0 KB Created: 2021-02-22 13:54:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: b6ede47bc6f6d0585ae4f49b05a1bcbd SHA-1: a7517e6165c427719dfe680a4aaf7640859070dc SHA-256: 5da3261145ee75979a781985d628d66637b0552e4fe0a52b4875ac21717a212f
702 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Hancitor · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros that execute a second-stage payload. The Document_Open macro calls the ShellExecute API with the argument 'full32.exe' and a path constructed from the document's template path and a hardcoded string, indicating it attempts to launch an embedded executable. This executable was identified as 'embedded_office_00023284.exe' and is flagged by ClamAV as a Hancitor dropper.

Heuristics 18

  • Office EPRINT stream contains EMF object high CVE related OLE_EPRINT_EMF_OBJECT
    OLE ObjectPool contains an EPRINT stream with EMF data. This is rare in normal documents and is CVE-2007-3893/MS07-046-family evidence when paired with Office exploit payload anomalies, but the malformed EMF record is not proven by this rule alone.
  • OLE with Ole10Native — possible CVE-2026-21514 exploitation high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Document contains a Word OLE object with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. CVE-2026-21514 exploits OLE metadata validation; this stronger structure is treated as likely exploitation.
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE
    MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Hancitor-9845854-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Hancitor-9845854-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • PEB access via FS segment (x86) high SC_PEB_ACCESS
    PEB access via FS segment (x86)
  • Reference to ShellExecute API high SC_STR_SHELLEXEC
    Reference to ShellExecute API
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API
  • Reference to VirtualProtect API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALPROTECT
    Reference to VirtualProtect API
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
0ecf71ca6921ac7e87c7cf0619971236d8bdd300920766edcce611df253914b6		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 4488 bytes
embedded_office_00023284.exe
44c1c64a915d2afd8775d8e77730b5a42c5fd808768749eafffcb06e7801e5b3		 embedded-pe Office MZ+PE at offset 0x23284 206204 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Dropper.Hancitor-9835665-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
ole10native_00.bin
9ff6f1ba903f7761cab29c5b4191b5d4bda7b539afc705e83924c9c514fd02dd		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1675507370/Ole10Native 165230 bytes

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