Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5d83c6db845e7541…

MALICIOUS

PDF

372.4 KB Created: 2010-06-21 14:55:34 +04:00 Authoring application: 376377000P000D000F000C000r000e000a000t000o000r000 000V000e000r000s000i000o000n000 0001000.0000000.0000 (via GPL Ghostscript 8.71)
MD5: 5eb11015d7a4bd3595dee57ee634a8d9 SHA-1: c76c2c30c222545d0c73ab46ce7d6a86897a371c SHA-256: 5d83c6db845e75419f67adcd0b3f49a10cc74bc5b0d2d7c1a6b9a08f1572f06b
458 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains JavaScript that triggers a launch action for cmd.exe, exploiting CVE-2010-1240. This command then executes a dropped Windows executable, which is disguised as a PDF file named 'Internet-Bank1.pdf'. The embedded URL suggests a phishing lure related to online banking.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\Internet-Bank1.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://online.bank.rs.ru/hb/faces/rs/RSIndex.jspx
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/iX/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
Internet-Bank1.pdf
60d60d79897ff26b4864e418851222dbf366bca6162f58979549a7168593808f		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 29 at offset 0x11FFD 319488 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.74, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
javascript_obj0030_000.js
7e6cb04012c9675c76eaf45842e1b1aa90d61ebe673ee3d154145defe82694b6		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 30 at offset 0x5CC5D 63 bytes
stream_005_off000060dd.bin
da82123d24c44c57fde5b1749205e247dab4deecef641ed1e1d2de1e76c682e7		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x60DD 39900 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off00004285.bin
e450b01688e74fe45205455a56e60675a3c61797cd569ac6a1701d905e1aa60a		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4285 14156 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000bdc5.bin
60e736cacebda1bc557c65bef0490ca9aa9941a2adca07ec5475416842dea6ca		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xBDC5 36200 bytes

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