Malicious Office (OOXML) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5d7a975ab4831c5b…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .XLSX

58.5 KB Created: 2021-10-27 10:31:49 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 12.0000
MD5: b0732a124dc78cb62099958f83bac00a SHA-1: 4b43e7b2023df522af375627fd1847818523cbdb SHA-256: 5d7a975ab4831c5b9d316f8a3b71fb633eb44d8ea6072a18e96f0acec15d6cf5
182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample contains Excel 4.0 macros that reconstruct a command to execute 'mshta C:\ProgramData\excel.rtf'. This command is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload from one of the three embedded URLs. The use of XLM macros and the command execution pattern are indicative of a downloader malware.

Heuristics 4

  • Excel 4.0 macro sheet (1 sheet(s)) critical OOXML_XLM_MACROSHEET
    Spreadsheet contains an Excel 4.0 (XLM) macro sheet — XLM was a major Office malware vector during 2020-2022 and evaded many VBA-focused controls before Microsoft tightened XLM defaults. Even legitimate XLM use is rare in modern workbooks. The macro sheet is stored as XLSB/BIFF12 binary content, which many XML-only OOXML scanners miss.
  • XLM payload reassembled from CHAR()/split formulas critical OOXML_XLM_REASSEMBLED_PAYLOAD
    An Excel 4.0 macro sheet builds its payload inside the formula token stream by concatenating per-character CHAR() calls and string fragments, so no WinAPI name, shell command, or URL is ever contiguous in the .bin for a literal-bytes scan to find. Reassembling the formulas recovered download/execute API names, LOLBin commands (regsvr32/rundll32/mshta/wmic/powershell), or a payload URL — the de-obfuscated download-and-run kill chain.
  • URL reconstructed from XLM cell array (3 URLs) critical OOXML_XLM_CELL_ARRAY_URL
    Excel 4.0 macro sheet stages its payload URL across individual numeric cells (one ASCII charcode per cell) or inside an embedded HTA that uses VBScript Chr()/&-concat obfuscation. The reconstructed URL is invisible to literal-bytes URL extraction because it is never contiguous in the workbook stream. URLs were recovered by walking the BIFF12 record stream of every worksheet and macrosheet part and decoding RK/inline-string cells in both row-major and column-major order.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/905155070591631412/905158687566495804/aZMIV.mp3
    • https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/905155070591631412/905158455092973628/zwvCintovGt.mp3
    • https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/905155070591631412/905157602596495410/WefKgrhSYQq.mp3

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
xlm_sheet_00.bin
d1d841e00c03568e57ead9b266d9dfcac93a5deb9be373fc0f118e5af3e07e46		 xlm-macrosheet OOXML XLM macro sheet: xl/macrosheets/sheet1.bin 114096 bytes

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