Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5d732c4bac56f473…

MALICIOUS

PDF

59.1 KB Created: 2020-12-20 20:51:26 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-11-02
MD5: 07b06fa563814a324e066f68517051d2 SHA-1: 728b2fd1efa3e422ccaa4629cc5b4d120855be1b SHA-256: 5d732c4bac56f4730cce14e1a7ddaec97f6ba68dcc282bc021ad003fc0898a95
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous embedded links, with a critical heuristic firing for a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, suggests a lure related to 'City siege sniper y8'. The presence of multiple links hosted on disposable domains and the ML classifier's high confidence indicate a malicious intent, likely for phishing or malware distribution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9996

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/strik?utm_term=city+siege+sniper+y8 In PDF document text
    • https://wizodorifezeniv.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134715638/zewasuzefux-barifijeroga.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sevujamipoviku.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134234740/a0fa3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://siwizapetodid.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134041585/225330e43b634.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4415081/normal_5fd6107659cfb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kuguzozivef.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739994/1697005.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fetibafavi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776688/4a6856ac8883d8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4376606/normal_5f952a6720dad.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4381740/normal_5fa9dcef36196.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://damuxuru.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134040763/batijolanifoxa-pelasoral.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jipuzalo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134693454/gikalakubasig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4493550/normal_5fc1c2f14439b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4423171/normal_5fb328cb06146.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xamapebonijos/54949292336.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/selivuvumepaveb/class_11_english_grammar_practice_with_answers.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/fonazuzixagizir/pampered_chef_micro_cooker_instructions.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ad2a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xAD2A 4944 bytes
SHA-256: 034a0b070bcfb786adb1ba525aad77a5e2280b9d373503fd963338851b16803a
font_01_sfnt_off0000be1c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xBE1C 10044 bytes
SHA-256: 4c1c562f50e07fb453907de6b738bd137b625080f5cc264f2bfdbf26046149f3

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