Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5d62c670cbddb850…

MALICIOUS

PDF

41.6 KB Created: 2020-10-28 10:12:49 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-11-02
MD5: c921685f4e3a232f25c24739834a5104 SHA-1: 223ec3c41287c2f6d2286ad852c78526c7426e90 SHA-256: 5d62c670cbddb8503401e0a55ae1b9d6a337d0a6532dcd72124ed48bc6d6c5b1
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to known malicious redirectors or disposable hosting. The document body text is minimal and appears to be a lure to encourage clicks on these links. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness, supporting the conclusion that this PDF is designed to redirect users to harmful sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/strik?keyword=name+three+physical+properties+of+aluminum+foil In PDF document text
    • https://gimejexoxixaza.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131872185/kojurufilufopimob.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://putigazabikikim.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132682718/e467f6cd0.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fotejisatowonu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132302873/3109733.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4370528/normal_5f8b6f1aa3c9b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4405467/normal_5f96e532c4885.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4367299/normal_5f8754b97c8c8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4373770/normal_5f8b85b022503.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pavowojavujide.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398322/fupib.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sijevunima.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131859613/kewoxisibe_vukuvirezikopat_zupite_xuguna.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fufivivol.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873849/pikaxulamevafuse.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/dc4782e4-de98-4c90-bc90-197e3e18561a/23356854109.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/b48d9624-cd41-4618-97c7-f4ccc50f463a/18052242798.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0483/3735/4903/files/open_head_drum_closure_instructions.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0478/3754/4607/files/vugezof.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/degisapemifa/kevuburu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/rozebofukixus/punekar_act_book.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000063fd.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x63FD 5328 bytes
SHA-256: ab6597fa10350791265d6e5cb9c33ecf8989dda2a386b6405106ca6363f0ac4c
font_01_sfnt_off000075fe.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x75FE 10348 bytes
SHA-256: e21fecd38515c8e08e0a39865e45421e50b1ac4b9668ab7d86995de6e0c13224

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