Emotet Office (OLE) malware analysis — malicious · 5d4bee6f5bb0d02b

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

157.6 KB Created: 2020-09-15 13:42:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word

MD5: 031be6a39da92ccedefc3ef3e5cc12aa SHA-1: 1eed6a05b977b6b13a8df2cafed8f1cdf7d53088 SHA-256: 5d4bee6f5bb0d02b980f21c2ae731bd12d5de2e2810058e6098fc888a7cc6f7b

262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample contains a VBA macro with a Document_Open auto-execution routine. This macro utilizes CreateObject to launch an obfuscated PowerShell stager, as indicated by the OLE_USERFORM_OBFUSCATED_POWERSHELL heuristic. The ClamAV detection name further supports the Emotet family attribution. The primary function of the VBA code is to execute this PowerShell stager, which is designed to download and run a secondary payload.

Heuristics 7

Hidden UserForm PowerShell EncodedCommand stager critical OLE_USERFORM_OBFUSCATED_POWERSHELL

OLE document contains a UTF-16LE form/property string with an obfuscated PowerShell -EncodedCommand payload. The observed macro family reconstructs this hidden string with Split/Join or UserForm property reads and launches it through WMI/COM process creation. This is downloader malware, not an Office CVE exploit.
ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Emotet-9762371-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Emotet-9762371-0
Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN

Document_Open macro
CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ

CreateObject call
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC

Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS

Document contains VBA macro code
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas` `8bee8f90d9dfb3891c7c232e7baf01a2aaa2db95a501fe4ff2d320babae29389`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source)	22935 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.