Office (OOXML) malware analysis — malicious · 5d1f155ed6784848

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

17.1 KB Created: 2021-07-20 08:50:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000

MD5: be08549dadc5fa5ea9f946a481f3dae6 SHA-1: 71fd8bf60ea79fb246a66cbd3c4f88b96895c776 SHA-256: 5d1f155ed6784848c24993ae77bd49efa6c2ce82931fcb6275efe8cfc09e0dca

222 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.005 Visual Basic T1218.005 System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains a VBA macro within the Document_Open subroutine. This macro utilizes the Shell function to execute MSHTA, which in turn attempts to download and execute content from the URL 'http://admagic.agency/N2/Encoding.txt'. This indicates a macro-based downloader attack pattern, likely intended to fetch and execute a further stage of malware.

Heuristics 6

Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL

Shell() call in VBA
LOLBin reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_LOLBIN

LOLBin reference in VBA
Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN

Document_Open macro
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC

Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA

Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL http://admagic.agency/N2/Encoding.txt
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahash
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas` `146231d8c7c026972d7f49e19b0fc6e0ee09c8519807591d34ec0e3a7e75abe4`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML)	380 bytes
`vbaProject_00.bin` `e2f600406f0f59e92560bec66f54b0de36164d85f4b3c39d462fa328132fac3d`	vba-project	OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin	7680 bytes

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