Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5d1cd8fe8dcf84f0…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

14.1 KB Created: 2019-10-07 08:48:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2020-05-25
MD5: ca861c081bd4f274eb1f784532850bfc SHA-1: f2fbccca22ab61d23f3aca3e582cf5b01762de06 SHA-256: 5d1cd8fe8dcf84f07de86f6ad102c554e76ce91b55c3f4a8a90f9d155de52d91
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an OOXML document that contains an external OLE object pointing to a remote URL, indicative of exploiting CVE-2017-8759. This heuristic suggests the document is designed to lure the user into downloading and executing a secondary payload from the specified URL, which is a common tactic for malware droppers.

Heuristics 4

  • OOXML OLE2Link remote document — CVE-2017-8759 related high CVE related CVE_2017_8759_RELATED
    Document contains an o:OLEObject Type=Link whose external oleObject relationship fetches a remote Office-looking document. That is the OOXML OLE2Link staging shape used by CVE-2017-8759 campaigns when the remote document/WSDL supplies the SOAP moniker payload; the local file alone does not contain the WSDL body needed for an exact match.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-7381105-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-7381105-0
  • External OLE object relationship high OOXML_EXTERNAL_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an oleObject relationship whose target is an external HTTP(S) URL. Office resolves this through OLE/object update paths rather than as a normal user-clicked hyperlink.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://xinblasta.us/cj/SIYRHZ.Doc In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvasIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
emf_00.emf ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image1.emf 2532 bytes
SHA-256: 260ea82c0c7a4b7ba29eb6e0a088f9aa3f934acd0bff346074b028785883acb9

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