Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5d164474031567a2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.7 KB Created: 2020-08-25 13:06:51 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 708fd7f57d86da7b9d06d563d1b58936 SHA-1: 5776a068b814b42302851d330f810da6eec74135 SHA-256: 5d164474031567a2e1a5d0e5f943031914857c246f2fdd71554131aa599f1810
194 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The PDF contains a lure for a Wi-Fi driver, directing users to a redirector URL that likely leads to malware. It also contains a heuristic indicating a clipboard command execution lure, suggesting the user copy and paste commands into a shell. The ML classifier strongly flagged this PDF as malicious, and the presence of numerous external links, some pointing to potentially malicious infrastructure, further supports this assessment.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/pify?keyword=wifi+driver+for+windows+10+hp
    • http://xutowir.coiffureonlyyou.net/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380349/7116938.pdf
    • http://files.ohiodesign.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739212/fewalobonovel.pdf
    • http://files.thefensk.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131452735/lokozob.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/0041/3856/files/bizuneturu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/1384/7710/files/aventuras_5th_edition_free.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/5811/8312/files/abendstille_berall.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0464/6014/1736/files/games_2019_free.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/3603/3695/files/familia_nuclear_biparental.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/6191/1458/files/bsp_png_tt_form.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/2537/5125/files/16162402150.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/8120/2854/files/vumorev.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/6935/7728/files/runumawomugumutisamesili.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/6473/7433/files/40230674343.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/9910/2110/files/24207803486.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000066ba.bin
3a6361257be661718b9613519adef8fb1d327158b0a7c7a30de5abb048a1a59c		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x66BA 5248 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000078a9.bin
daad3f347a4f42f432ee9983e619a7c063e36761dba5934b469418034847e28e		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x78A9 1800 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00008137.bin
0e96ed524b601d53de63a83b938f5279aa313902527b4679498d825ae4bb6712		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8137 10532 bytes

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