Dridex — Office (OOXML) / .XLSM malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5d0ea1496ae9c586…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .XLSM

340.4 KB Created: 2021-02-24 12:58:12 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 15.0300
MD5: 00a0cc14106339c719610d43665f13b2 SHA-1: 8f759042f0d1d133ba05c9bb7adf6498861f55f5 SHA-256: 5d0ea1496ae9c586a7fdb5b275a0f68a6ff15e7f72f9b61f4580b56f1c5b581f
270 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Dridex · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an XLSM file containing a Workbook_Open VBA macro, which is a common technique for executing malicious code upon opening. The macro uses GetObject to likely download and execute a second-stage payload from one of the embedded URLs. ClamAV detection confirms this as Doc.Dropper.Dridex-9845759-0, strongly indicating the Dridex family.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Dridex-9845759-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Dridex-9845759-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • Workbook_Open macro high OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://treat.zeenodentals.com/wp-content/uploads/tcb_lp_templates/js/es48S99pyo.php
    • https://topcompany.pro/vendor/ezyang/htmlpurifier/library/DnXHe60MSplg.php
    • https://stiri-romania-24.ro/wp-admin/css/colors/blue/kf4L8l0iS.php
    • https://michaelehaskins.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/LQX2NEacVo.php
    • https://demo.gruporoyale.net/_lib/libraries/sys/emogrifier/rKILr5dU3ONzhZ.php
    • https://pinpoint-shopping.com/wp-content/plugins/get-your-number/css/LbUV6Ov89T.php
    • https://www.tomobil.online/media/editors/tinymce/js/dSG0mgEidE.php
    • https://nietolem.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/o7b2z0qnJ3r.php
    • https://alapon.pw/wp-content/plugins/classic-editor/js/oZp5DmYq5djUmjR.php
    • https://gsdclubofghana.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/gmxPotmutinp2.php
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
3b4c047d11c8d912cb04b57cc061c8549ee520e36f46c3c48628a443e5f0a54a
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 13675 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
323b6c43c498db5b7e91b751eba57c5beca42289ad8f6c73502967d4354f629b
vba-project OOXML VBA project: xl/vbaProject.bin 54784 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Dridex-9845759-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely