Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5d0e0a36fee02ee2…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOCX

133.0 KB Created: 2020-04-19 01:19:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 4a816450d5c6400532714482d65122f8 SHA-1: e1ae6b67253e170c9306863a7713351f129d13ff SHA-256: 5d0e0a36fee02ee2299dc84c2d1b6e6a2b59f68a6f7ccfe00d213704adbb7df5
484 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample contains a critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER heuristic, indicating an obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader. The presence of OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC and OLE_VBA_SHELL rules confirms that the VBA macro downloads a file and executes it using WScript.Shell. The macro's intent is to download and execute a second-stage payload, as evidenced by the critical heuristics.

Heuristics 12

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC
    VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • ClamAV: Xls.Macro.Obfuscation-9804250-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Xls.Macro.Obfuscation-9804250-0
  • Reference to Windows Script Host high SC_STR_WSCRIPT
    Reference to Windows Script Host
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
2d71dcd1192965df475b20c22ac4fdc77a7bedd10a7c8ab06bd7e913769f2c0a
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 14556 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 69 long base64-like blob(s).