Malicious Office (OLE) / .AM — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5cfb45c72bb6e922…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .AM

175.0 KB Created: 2001-12-14 14:26:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word 9.0
MD5: 460d83d5c699e7d80e0819da1cdc262e SHA-1: a381dcfae7a31ab872423a42937c6d5d4892ae47 SHA-256: 5cfb45c72bb6e922895d2cba385582e7248c6ba89e791d6925d4dc0b836aa923
322 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell

The sample exploits CVE-2006-6456, a vulnerability in Microsoft Word's handling of malformed table SPRMs. Heuristics indicate the use of WinExec, CreateProcess, VirtualAlloc, LoadLibrary, and GetProcAddress, suggesting the execution of shellcode and dynamic loading of libraries. Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with an execution flag points towards the execution of a secondary payload, likely downloaded from one of the embedded URLs.

Heuristics 9

  • CVE-2006-6456 — Microsoft Word malformed table SPRM critical CVE exact CVE_2006_6456
    WordDocument contains a malformed table border-color SPRM in the CVE-2006-6456 shape: a valid table-SPRM cluster is followed by an invalid high-byte 0xFF SPRM where Word expects a normal sprmTBrc*Cv record. Vulnerable Word 2000/2002/2003 parsers corrupt memory while handling this malformed data structure.
  • Reference to WinExec API high SC_STR_WINEXEC
    Reference to WinExec API
  • Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS
    Reference to CreateProcess API
  • Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag high SC_STR_CMD
    Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 179,208 bytes but its declared streams total only 94,801 bytes — 84,407 bytes (47%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ihearttibet.org/?page_id=20
    • http://www.tibetnetwork.org/resources-10march2010