Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5cdac8da6371b047…

MALICIOUS

PDF

74.2 KB Created: 2021-06-18 18:20:55 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-11-24
MD5: b22d7ed6210de4615c8ec0f367292921 SHA-1: 7ef40933b1eb35e784fc515c16f7cc379ac075bc SHA-256: 5cdac8da6371b047b3b77065813a008cd7326bd41e371df8c4f99d0a00311e96
224 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains multiple heuristics indicating it is a phishing lure, including SEO poisoning tactics and links to compromised CMS uploads. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, appears to be a lure for downloading a file related to 'Fortnite'. The presence of multiple external URIs and the ML classifier's high confidence score suggest malicious intent. The document likely serves as a dropper for further malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://hylevel.net/Uploadfiles/files/nukofijawejepu.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://cy2hand.com/userfiles/nomidutaguzogomudijonogax.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://angkortaxiservice.com/userfiles/file/wejizifew.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.timtransportes.com/home/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bbb1e1e8f3f---14588335508.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://brodart01.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ejeepcemcnqchv27hetg95d2nn/50544070976.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://deltagroup.bg/uploads/file/bojuzodeluwidujexoj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://79.170.40.182/boothtastic.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606c7ca273b35---pulasapixuvinefurajoga.pdfPDF link annotation
    • https://evocative.ru/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bbc05e2f6bd---23657304622.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://eventspicer.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/45190887497.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://argentum.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/jbqk87pkf7f0fpd9u3je31gtj2/82861415743.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://logistra.fr/ressource/site-image/files/42063265102.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://arunimaflavours.com/userfiles/file/4430832250.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pavcargo.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c4a24ec8087dec63365a64165d27b705/22637817784.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://forkidsvietnam.vn/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/fu8pvdlmp1ktf9i1fl04bdjm62/nuzevuloti.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.adelaarenergy.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/qfaaan6salntu3s527sh7fsv4c/88395534650.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://angelojrobles.com/admin_initial_test/userfiles/file/zixuvuwizajavemazorilituf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/FevRqgeaUVY/uplcv?utm_term=fortnite+download+for+mobile+phonePDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e3b1.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE3B1 5292 bytes
SHA-256: 8c3160ef0dfd7aba8b1f220fb594f686982401a577756d2eb6d108a37bc8f5ec
font_01_sfnt_off0000f596.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF596 11220 bytes
SHA-256: 357b3d0c595711a35b5af7f094be81755417aa5f8df75c3ff49a60b849ba2146