Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5cd363eb118b4cd8…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.68 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: 49794de9b03889a8dcd15cc405498db7 SHA-1: 691062de90c39a3577672592379665a270a2223a SHA-256: 5cd363eb118b4cd811c9e911169d4110a4792ca06fa1c8b406c9385022a60cb4
132 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an Excel file that exploits CVE-2017-0199 via an OLE2Link object to download a remote payload from the URL https://kutt.rhaimes.com/r7XT9w. Additionally, it contains an embedded PDF with suspicious static findings, suggesting a multi-stage attack. The VBA macros themselves do not contain executable statements, but the primary exploit mechanism is clear.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://kutt.rhaimes.com/r7XT9w
    • https://wwww.microsoft.com0
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • https://docs.microsoft.com/typography/abouthttp://lucasfonts.comMicrosoft
    • http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIT_License
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicCodSigPCA_2010-07-06.crl0Z
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicCodSigPCA_2010-07-06.crt0
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicRooCerAut_2010-06-23.crl0Z
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicRooCerAut_2010-06-23.crt0��
    • http://www.microsoft.com/PKI/docs/CPS/default.htm0@
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicTimStaPCA_2010-07-01.crl0Z
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicTimStaPCA_2010-07-01.crt0
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/Microsoft%20Time-Stamp%20PCA%202010(1).crl0l
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/certs/Microsoft%20Time-Stamp%20PCA%202010(1).crt0
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/Docs/Repository.htm0
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicRooCerAut_2010-06-23.crt0

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
stream_014_off0003f52b.bin
b0a7e7055d5b66edffe76c7b1f32ec80318d696df6181f1536f27aa69517872f		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x3F52B 566620 bytes
stream_015_off0006f1fe.bin
0d5715bfb4def94d644e408c5ed714ea2ac557b061d036e7fdcf0a2bf1c990e2		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x6F1FE 398152 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000882ce.bin
ff37b045be3591e8cfbfa76f5dec51bee78deccafa1dc391d1edb36502c7f815		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x882CE 346068 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off000b0600.pdf
32fa962c2225bb046c0732acc55292b4ac5ed1cb6870c0ef65d959b517dff4da		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xB0600 1036288 bytes

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