Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5ccd2d0c37db44e4…

MALICIOUS

RTF

209.9 KB First seen: 2019-08-04
MD5: f6b02b505e00ed67da536787577138dc SHA-1: 5401573960e0917d4a4fc2b939438d9a22f62c8a SHA-256: 5ccd2d0c37db44e45f5fb49ce2fd8fd7a147fd405d5afeeceef7be9e97ac1867
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an OLE object that exploits CVE-2017-11882 via the Equation Editor. This technique is commonly used to deliver a second-stage payload, leading to arbitrary code execution on the victim's machine. The specific Equation Editor class 'eQuAtion.3' is a strong indicator of this exploit.

Heuristics 5

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001228.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1228 65186 bytes
SHA-256: 74606077f113f47c2cde6b82d0403abc34fb395d04d4f7cb4533805ddc06d246

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