Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5cb97de4fe684f6e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

32.7 KB Created: 2020-06-08 12:07:20 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: e8bb85966c0a0d45bcf50dc4d1eca770 SHA-1: 1c5d9114b182f5439b111c1941921e36f0d5d2df SHA-256: 5cb97de4fe684f6e89bad6c81393fd0c06aba37fe964cc15259ade689e7825bf
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous external links, many of which point to PDF files hosted on domains that appear to be part of a link farm. The document body text and embedded URLs suggest a lure for free software downloads, specifically Microsoft Excel, which is a common tactic for distributing malware. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness, supporting the assessment of a malicious PDF.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://aaafinance.net/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739476/130739476.html#microsoft+excel+free+download+2010
    • http://chriswilliamshypnosis.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130604793/e34d18105d.pdf
    • http://drsophiarichardson.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130621031/1573744.pdf
    • http://ndwcin.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380915/f657f547f56.pdf
    • http://kitcatcandles.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131378780/1536331.pdf
    • http://younginnovatorcompetition.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739004/jujarurufebajudo.pdf
    • http://mynewdomainlive.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856666/voxobibad_duzik.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://jedujasug.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/48358464777.pdf
    • https://todetok.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/xukug.pdf
    • https://teguvadebar.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/betasej.pdf
    • https://sokatuvep109458814.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/pevawarorititesaviwiteg.pdf
    • https://dodanixix.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/7074410297.pdf
    • https://kutexales.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/dujezuxivolaputanute.pdf
    • https://refaxiwaw.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/bexezigonu.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000569a.bin
02f5a55f36fee8f77b68d59f3184111ad35c943a94a64ae34d2ffef70f05c66f
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x569A 10596 bytes