Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5c9c6de69a03b07f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

181.0 KB Created: 2001-12-14 14:26:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word 9.0
MD5: 3f7c4f37d89d3e4f1c8a326dac723829 SHA-1: f71e869b64e8321efb3a5c7202fe8efc26397123 SHA-256: 5c9c6de69a03b07f31b4a0be914bc84f6a044bd3db74a7858bd7f2221fd71cc6
322 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The sample is a malicious Microsoft Word document exploiting CVE-2006-6456, a vulnerability related to malformed table SPRM data. Heuristics indicate the use of WinExec, CreateProcess, VirtualAlloc, LoadLibrary, and GetProcAddress, suggesting the execution of shellcode and potentially the loading of additional malicious code. The presence of suspicious cmd.exe invocation further supports the execution of arbitrary commands.

Heuristics 9

  • CVE-2006-6456 — Microsoft Word malformed table SPRM critical CVE exact CVE_2006_6456
    WordDocument contains a malformed table border-color SPRM in the CVE-2006-6456 shape: a valid table-SPRM cluster is followed by an invalid high-byte 0xFF SPRM where Word expects a normal sprmTBrc*Cv record. Vulnerable Word 2000/2002/2003 parsers corrupt memory while handling this malformed data structure.
  • Reference to WinExec API high SC_STR_WINEXEC
    Reference to WinExec API
  • Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS
    Reference to CreateProcess API
  • Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag high SC_STR_CMD
    Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 185,344 bytes but its declared streams total only 94,801 bytes — 90,543 bytes (49%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

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