Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5c991515f6f925cc…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

503.0 KB Created: 2006-04-25 14:28:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2014-06-27
MD5: b7c75c264f3baa81b1666059f2603952 SHA-1: 1f8218ede43d9c8f2b0d7bef462359b8ffab5cc9 SHA-256: 5c991515f6f925cc39798f8bbf371d1da7a0c458c2427f33869d52fb91f229fc
280 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The file is a malicious OLE document containing legacy WordBasic macro virus markers and a large slack space anomaly, indicating obfuscation. It embeds another OLE object, which ClamAV identifies as Doc.Trojan.Wazzu-6. The document body presents itself as a quality checklist, likely a lure to encourage the user to interact with the embedded malicious content.

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Doc.Trojan.Wazzu-6 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Trojan.Wazzu-6
  • Embedded Office document has suspicious static findings critical EMBEDDED_OFFICE_CHILD_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A CFB/OLE Office document was found inside another file type and its carved contents matched Office exploit or payload heuristics. This catches wrapped exploit documents where the top-level file routes to a PE, archive, or generic scanner instead of Office.
  • Legacy WordBasic macro-virus markers high OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_MACRO_VIRUS
    OLE Word document contains legacy WordBasic auto-execution macro markers such as AutoOpen plus ToolsMacro/MacroFile/fileMacro/globMacro or named historical macro-virus strings. These old Word 6/95 macro forms are not exposed as a modern VBA project, so normal VBA source extraction can miss them.
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    This finding applies to a carved embedded Office document found at a nonzero offset inside the submitted file, not directly to the top-level document. OLE file is 495,616 bytes but its declared streams total only 13,885 bytes — 481,731 bytes (97%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • CFB header with no readable streams medium OLE_PARSE_EMPTY_STREAMS
    This finding applies to a carved embedded Office document found at a nonzero offset inside the submitted file, not directly to the top-level document. The file begins with a valid OLE2/CFB header but exposes no directory streams. A non-empty compound document with an unreadable directory is anomalous — it is seen with truncated/corrupt files and, more importantly, with content deliberately shifted off byte boundaries to defeat parsers while the host application still recovers the object.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_office_off00004c00.ole embedded-office Embedded OLE/CFB Office body inside ole container at offset 0x4C00 495616 bytes
SHA-256: 4f064b5eaea4fcc18723dbd5da01f4ab8aefa81449953d8779cade6d3b088755
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Trojan.Wazzu-6
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
embedded_office_off00005afb.ole embedded-office Embedded OLE/CFB Office body inside ole container at offset 0x5AFB 491781 bytes
SHA-256: abf08c328ae1fb2774c1e9850f7ce56bd5fdeba1d5751740dc86ae8bd0e5a0dd
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Trojan.Wazzu-6
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely

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