Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5c8fb5836ea8d503…

MALICIOUS

RTF

197.7 KB Created: 2020-02-10 07:22:00
MD5: 80aa5bb928a77be1fbe7eca539f04000 SHA-1: fafdf8bc2a91dac0737a5804affab6fbd72a08ca SHA-256: 5c8fb5836ea8d5035e70daaa540f903c06e42776c1c4c0d0b25871b3ca8a6166
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects and triggers critical vulnerabilities CVE-2017-11882 (Equation Editor FONT record overflow) and CVE-2017-8759 (MSXML SAX OLE activation). These exploits are commonly used to execute arbitrary code, likely to download and run a secondary payload from the unknown URL http://zephyrglobal.ae/admin/foranled.msi. The file's purpose is to exploit these vulnerabilities for initial execution.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882
    Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://zephyrglobal.ae/admin/foranled.msi
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000088df.bin
0990b9f0fc6c968a19fcdfc76f48d9babba46c408fa6383852c4abd883b15da8		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x88DF 15892 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.