Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5c8d5ad8e9479eff…

MALICIOUS

PDF

39.2 KB Created: 2020-10-07 01:26:10 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-15
MD5: 975620f5a5e6fe085b55c3258026d090 SHA-1: b9159512946d0eaf2ebbf991074bdb3755132961 SHA-256: 5c8d5ad8e9479effa4892d3214ab6fb04f5ec69ab89397a09fe73609fd76bde5
184 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/strik?keyword=yas+i%25C3%25A7in+profil+resmi In PDF document text
    • https://site-1040135.mozfiles.com/files/1040135/4393077672.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1040687.mozfiles.com/files/1040687/41274215348.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1038378.mozfiles.com/files/1038378/vejaro.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1039150.mozfiles.com/files/1039150/18623249869.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1040663.mozfiles.com/files/1040663/46471514039.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.woodendrsl.org/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813855/ludifi_pibuja_xogupojut_govujexugabipiz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xavemaz.counterviolenceusa.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380594/c014c42f1a20b4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.collegetalentagency.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383647/808bb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xosig.unswbaseballsoftball.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164319/0100e34b89d81.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pobefefe.legacycreekgsmd.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132710773/wixag_desap_mokam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.webstriple.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453194/farudeganame.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tisojo.ushistoryepalacios.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740572/5490997.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.instasync.net/uploads/1/3/1/1/131163914/e46de.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.corneliusmullerproductions.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164475/polati.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.allergysupportcentre.org/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070934/3d82a087ee.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/82a5b9d2-793d-4a6d-b8c6-61b42ad3795a/74375491195.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/b080a31f-da10-47ba-a046-50c279da9d70/medetuxoxuxivofemi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005944.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5944 5192 bytes
SHA-256: 354e255336166081a789e9e3e4f9be1a1f2350abcc90a3ef15c9bf46f0c93890
font_01_sfnt_off00006ad6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6AD6 11404 bytes
SHA-256: 392df6603353bde4851bbb2e0ddbd01531c63d00cb86a1eade74ca54a8062e47

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