Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5c7b987745474cf7…

MALICIOUS

PDF

41.8 KB Created: 2020-08-30 00:59:16 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 4130e33dcfa8148a0b39a34e97d4dc53 SHA-1: 98edc6ebdf0f1acc9c9bed5cd23d92cd4f63542b SHA-256: 5c7b987745474cf751b6e1d288f20eb0a30b957cdf9e04ec994a476118abf573
194 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many pointing to Shopify domains, but one critical link directs to a known malicious redirector. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains the malicious URL and references to 'comparing molecular and ionic compou', suggesting a lure. The presence of numerous PDF links and a malicious redirector indicates a likely attempt to drive traffic to malicious infrastructure, possibly for SEO poisoning or further exploitation.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/wix?keyword=comparing+molecular+and+ionic+compou
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/5897/8207/files/32552305249.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/8375/1831/files/83677664951.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/6063/3504/files/tiduva.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/9889/8592/files/robuwevixum.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/0205/1229/files/misik.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/d54300_5a7237e787834445b4b31c34a451447e.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/cf79db_eba94f2928c94c868ad0491d7ceeb1b0.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/fa6f14_49419a8b1ce349e7938e7116dbf799bb.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/87a178_9088a49680b543ad8a45a9e6e1ebe80f.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_049435b7521a46c4a353f38bb6e5166b.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_0dd76032c2fb4879846c6c50cf3f39df.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/2022/1607/files/faluxelur.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/5464/5916/files/likeludozezurewizateramuk.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/3455/9143/files/cmd_commands_windows_7_hacks.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/3053/6614/files/bobagaropozalarujevaw.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/3495/9256/files/ganemar.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/f
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006630.bin
5c4674083e1491501885be14583010e80963f0cb6f9bfa60a87d948db55efa95		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6630 5120 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00007777.bin
1f1d47acec28d9ad50820ba3b5a72680fb6b0154c4100f8e17aec767d30f3ec5		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7777 10236 bytes

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