Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5c5b055a8551df43…

MALICIOUS

PDF

81.0 KB Created: 2021-05-30 03:44:18 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-01
MD5: c53f03243364a10b9adb68fa06b514d0 SHA-1: 061f6b0546d65ea9ac84970dfd98eaa340bf73d8 SHA-256: 5c5b055a8551df43a8e81b8c16efde9cf37171e919fe27d78de10d4a47785a40
204 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate maliciousness. The PDF contains numerous links to external sites, many of which are hosted on compromised WordPress installations, suggesting a link farm designed to distribute malicious files. The presence of an IP literal URL further supports this, as it bypasses domain-based reputation checks. No scripts were extracted, but the overall structure points to a phishing or malware distribution campaign.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9996

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.tif.cn/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/a041dptfnvv9hsrt66i9hsb3ur/xekekemebajidofupejuxu.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://loskutova.site/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e48b78cff4f13d7ba79bf0bb8a6ee657/70588390842.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://harpethvalleyhealth.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5fafb6445eb21a279fb594f514cd88de/93157780966.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://hylyt.co/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/18b3b6346debe2041d54b65f4549cc77/liperon.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.nestroots.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/bftrq24gghlm9m9d6i445cvjh0/bojanevolulu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.hangmandigital.com/files/file/35265533798.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://driver-jazda.pl/upload/file/goxubefuj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pck.malopolska.pl/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/60769a48bd41606942cd89e91c35aa0a/33881238115.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kameleonhastanc.hu/files/file/9184996396.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.loockuniformes.com.br/home/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16095ab6a671ed---sepokejufalolut.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://157.230.241.115/image/upload/File/26476673691.pdfPDF link annotation
    • https://area34.info/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/chc930rd3iiu36eh0htb1995t3/sopodigegipenofuvuke.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.limratechnologies.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a8ad208185b---fafivejaj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.psalighting.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/bccf6d4844f425b06ae14a9cef093522/93198575896.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://webhostmurah.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609b3f4d57acf---kuzemejugidofab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/PmAiG5ZyT-k/uplcv?utm_term=download+story+saver+for+whatsapp+androidPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d99f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD99F 5168 bytes
SHA-256: 3abe4a15e23071353bc84a9ed9b97415fb9fd08446538f0aafb0ffac6f374c2d
font_01_sfnt_off0000eb47.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEB47 11572 bytes
SHA-256: 55e248269dc1ff8e256b8c4d2b1fe8f74429f125c01fe645d6a36a1a6dc0e802
font_02_sfnt_off000112ef.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x112EF 16204 bytes
SHA-256: 532315dfdc59b350d447ad91845dd8cc72a836e684f536ab9a4305dc5b53fb8e
font_03_sfnt_off0001281f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1281F 4324 bytes
SHA-256: b50a2106bf82917db0cd3cf88f63c5e8cc3298b343ace5cffc591b35df33d24c