Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5c44f2648b2c2ff7…

MALICIOUS

RTF

2.40 MB
MD5: f4fed27dc0246bb3947a8c2f0879180a SHA-1: a1bdba803e9e0b4f981ad11f14833dec400c82bd SHA-256: 5c44f2648b2c2ff7d1169516e88e666182bf58a849e5434f4b33aca933d5a9ea
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains multiple heuristics indicating the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 through an embedded Equation Editor OLE object. The presence of \objupdate and the specific ProgID 'Equation.3' strongly suggest that the file is designed to trigger this known vulnerability for arbitrary code execution. The embedded OLE object data, though truncated, likely contains the shellcode or exploit payload.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000df9.bin
d3e23f1af538898d6d09d4c8b8fe5400a4d8f6d7e9a56101f5675695ee972ed5
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xDF9 36011 bytes
objdata_01_off0001fc1b.bin
6b6a2cde12d7631f88c99bc53290739177b12e6a1a53ced97aa944990ea72f7d
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1FC1B 529442 bytes