Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5c32aed8b04f3a89…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

60.3 KB Created: 2020-04-28 09:58:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: af4fd920e097695781424662e7c120a3 SHA-1: 38a9a32c9fdb37435c7b1ef4aab8d1b1a3e0a382 SHA-256: 5c32aed8b04f3a896ad51ebaeb961bd59aae97f0c767dc54e9bd81e45bd580ef
350 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample is a Microsoft Office document containing VBA macros. The AutoOpen macro is triggered upon opening, which then uses the URLDownloadToFile function to download and execute a second-stage payload. This is further supported by the 'VBA URLDownloadToFile reversed-LOLBin launcher' heuristic firing.

Heuristics 9

  • URLDownloadToFile in VBA critical OLE_VBA_DOWNLOAD
    URLDownloadToFile in VBA
  • VBA URLDownloadToFile reversed-LOLBin launcher critical OLE_VBA_URLDOWNLOAD_REVERSED_LOLBIN
    VBA auto-exec macro downloads a payload with URLDownloadToFile and launches it through WScript.Shell.Exec using a reversed command string. This is a high-confidence downloader/launcher pattern, not an Office parser CVE.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Generic-7898874-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Generic-7898874-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
78749797efcae284dedd849684a3b647f6269a9e067758c93abe541db8a3e397
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 4889 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
1152983e3c835bdf150a50ea05e9f144e7bc4403be4f8544daa06ac054e2c79a
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 27136 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Generic-7898874-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely