Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5c2518bcb6355033…

MALICIOUS

PDF

79.7 KB Created: 2020-12-24 22:10:03 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-04
MD5: 799b4e43781260685fc3f16d6a5ebd0b SHA-1: 401debd50327b1d6807cf061ba1ab61decf8f8ae SHA-256: 5c2518bcb63550335433a1bdee2ebc0805740957f645bd5a643a635b295bd157
194 Risk Score
Tags
free-cdn-ebook-manual-lure

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, indicating a link farm or SEO manipulation tactic. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware distribution via the linked sites. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the presence of an AcroForm button with an action trigger suggests potential for JavaScript execution within the PDF, which could be used to redirect users or initiate downloads.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON
    PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffking.ru/123?utm_term=national+electrical+code+2020+handbook+pdf PDF link annotation
    • https://lonoripub.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135319728/7004859.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/dadakafopina/jjgdghv/neweveruxavakujemusinib.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/titolegun/CmLhcha/break_down_your_walls_lyrics.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xejinifinedi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135305438/suwisumek-valabujorenan.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ziwojezevuvige.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134500989/jexezoju-veroremoguxo-xegabak-fexujov.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/zokasejiz/LnuKFie/paxemabaxaxofomowom.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xebokedobonu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134719403/pivaketaliwujigasozi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mejofeva.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681501/5161985.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xesaranit.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132696194/fokigaka_lilopez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/99e02d38-2a52-419a-9ecc-0a1e80599b15/body_by_mg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/14d657e7-6cca-4a78-871d-defa83b16794/49492491273.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/7be92f8c-68c4-44a6-a8cb-dd17d81f83ae/76398605874.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f9bd.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF9BD 5512 bytes
SHA-256: 1b605b27249be4c505b8fa9af2fe24647fd43d8f26625f73441e46a4a91e42eb
font_01_sfnt_off00010c71.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10C71 10992 bytes
SHA-256: fe709f6a20a99dc7d7c7dce783334607187f5f83935672316a6cf5810a0f96b6

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