RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · 5bfde433abfb4b0b

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

433.3 KB

MD5: 6c27a8966a8fed0fc50b1fe520b401e0 SHA-1: 1324d0ddd390ad5489d30a3ee9f96cb6697786ef SHA-256: 5bfde433abfb4b0bc6ae15f266aad29e13e5b4b27288cc32a7cb81adc3a3da73

202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains critical heuristics indicating the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 via an embedded Equation Editor OLE object. This object, decoded and extracted, is likely a second-stage payload. The presence of OLE object data and the forced update mechanism further support the execution of embedded content.

Heuristics 6

Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE related CVE_2017_11882_RELATED

RTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off0000149c.bin` `b356ac515faff48db9e87c0447cb6217f3824069097ab6b17074c9b9a3a76cf2`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x149C	219060 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.

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