Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5bc11ccdd2c86a37…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

232.8 KB First seen: 2012-09-20
MD5: 01a0973fdfde550782a43bff8534cf3c SHA-1: 7ee98508715fe00e9b0e2fba18557992b2d4ae9f SHA-256: 5bc11ccdd2c86a37d2d7c0feedc4bbf0a2e899174c3e2fe14db371120a0240e6
700 Risk Score

Heuristics 15

  • CVE-2008-2244 — Microsoft Word record-parsing payload critical CVE likely CVE_2008_2244
    Word OLE document has normal small WordDocument/table streams, a large unallocated OLE slack region, and an executable or resolver shellcode payload in that slack. This is the static shape of the MS08-042 Word record-parsing exploit family tracked as CVE-2008-2244.
  • PowerPoint binary-format RCE payload — CVE-2011-1269 / MS11-036 family critical CVE likely PPT_BINARY_MEMORY_CORRUPTION_PAYLOAD
    A macro-free binary PowerPoint (.ppt) document carries a native code payload (embedded PE and/or process-injection shellcode), staged in an oversized binary stream. Legitimate presentations do not embed executables or shellcode; this is the payload half of a PowerPoint memory-corruption exploit (CVE-2011-1269 / MS11-036 family; the same record-overflow delivery is shared with CVE-2010-2572 and CVE-2009-0556).
  • Office EPRINT stream contains EMF object high CVE related OLE_EPRINT_EMF_OBJECT
    OLE ObjectPool contains an EPRINT stream with EMF data. This is rare in normal documents and is related Office object-delivery evidence when paired with exploit payload anomalies, but the malformed graphics record required for exact CVE attribution is not proven by this rule alone.
  • ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Enfal-78 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Trojan.Enfal-78
  • Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE
    MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
  • NOP sled detected high SC_NOP_SLED
    Found 20+ consecutive 0x90 bytes
    Disassembly hidden — these bytes score as degenerate, not coherent x86 code (single mnemonic 'add' is 83% of instructions — a sled or padding/filler run, not program logic).
  • Reference to WinExec API high SC_STR_WINEXEC
    Reference to WinExec API
  • Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS
    Reference to CreateProcess API
  • Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag high SC_STR_CMD
    Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 238,340 bytes but its declared streams total only 31,351 bytes — 206,989 bytes (87%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API
  • Reference to VirtualProtect API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALPROTECT
    Reference to VirtualProtect API

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_office_0001a400.exe embedded-pe Office MZ+PE at offset 0x1A400 130820 bytes
SHA-256: 5c7efabae86cf018cce877e0f18df4d89923b05662effea2fb2781acfff46728
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Enfal-78
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_STR_CMD, SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS, SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, InternetOpenA, LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress, CreateFileA Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): cmd.exe /c ", cmd.exe /c, cmd.exe