Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5bb1f1ea31b9e877…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.2 KB
MD5: 4fbbd5f9af7e98629a092023011e9262 SHA-1: 00bc89554c23800dfbbc8cdaa97ef2e67a72ce2c SHA-256: 5bb1f1ea31b9e87708b1964d6b472654751c6573449034d34b17aa940a50776c
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. This indicates an attempt to exploit a client execution vulnerability, likely delivered as a spearphishing attachment. No further IOCs were extracted from the static analysis.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000b1.bin
82698dbf9f7310f61df3fbeced07d4ede0d9263824ba46cbd909c1cd5ec43c53
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB1 1840 bytes