Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5b7f86ca95d81389…

MALICIOUS

PDF

43.0 KB Created: 2020-07-09 09:15:30 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 2ecf63fe2cbbf02edca9ab439e0397f6 SHA-1: 1348ba4039ceb616090065ca27b3b878694d5c46 SHA-256: 5b7f86ca95d813896c3ac1eaf7150052e23f1f4c0aa25e2f45f3cb2c0212b91c
214 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file is identified as malicious by multiple heuristics and a machine learning classifier, specifically flagged as a redirector and part of a link farm. The document body contains a deceptive title and numerous embedded URLs, suggesting an attempt to manipulate search engine results or direct users to malicious sites. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the presence of embedded URLs and the nature of the heuristics indicate a likely dropper or downloader functionality, potentially leveraging JavaScript for execution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-8990975-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-8990975-0
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/wb?keyword=united%20states%20government%20democracy%20in%20action%20pdf%20chapter%2014
    • http://files.brentwoodbayvet.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739780/jakilolabus.pdf
    • http://files.airmicrochip.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775902/nenexim.pdf
    • http://files.jjartmedia.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695994/tuzemutobogo.pdf
    • http://files.merarifernandez.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407165/6839308.pdf
    • http://files.mediterraneanmomma.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132712326/pazasizevuwegu.pdf
    • http://files.davesartdimensions.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606348/vojetiborakupo.pdf
    • http://files.southernhillsbiblechurch.org/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438150/koromabenedas.pdf
    • http://files.divine-pet-services.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775846/roketonosukezasufit.pdf
    • http://files.treblemakers.ie/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438024/tukexotodok.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://mawumobu.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/mivedejejarisiweguda.pdf
    • https://sunoripe23167673.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/lalopegumukotigibik.pdf
    • https://jotunajaf.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/komisimejazodol.pdf
    • https://padububoxu.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/biboruxupibax.pdf
    • https://zafuwuma.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/55295949248.pdf
    • https://jorerego.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/kepofil.pdf
    • https://lawivomeru.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/bifinijidavujozore.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/12509012650.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/89120948070.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/86399573169.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/94662163826.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/72710717911.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005d55.bin
97560ea701d480278f5160e3bc33b12ae9d8068c721827351261d2cd488cf2c5		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5D55 3184 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000068aa.bin
f69a89a3c69730373f6d616cac030a511c24c19ccbe07f283a7188db647cf0ef		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x68AA 5620 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00007bae.bin
6acf3b705248ce6e5f1733c0514ccd93dd17e9f07e1da60e936a83293e38e1c0		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7BAE 9992 bytes

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