Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5b7ee6d3514abf3f…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

34.8 KB First seen: 2023-03-27
MD5: 467af03029c4d46d5133a22e340f0b32 SHA-1: 0fc58dc23fc550ee2781621bd00c08bff48a97a8 SHA-256: 5b7ee6d3514abf3f5555f3cbdaf931b47ba11f1c8c9961dc21c1ef77ed0a226d
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution: Malicious Link T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains multiple indicators of malicious intent, including OLE object data and an automatically linked OLE object specifically related to the Equation Editor. The presence of a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing' further suggests a social engineering tactic to bypass security measures. These factors strongly indicate an attempt to exploit a vulnerability, likely within the Equation Editor component, to achieve code execution.

Heuristics 5

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00005ab5.bin
7575169808a40378d10b3987e8e9c092cc92256999d3df8c408a2f13ee403024
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x5AB5 1633 bytes