Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5b7142a23b456750…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

39.2 KB First seen: 2022-12-27
MD5: 15e8256b86620cbfbeab5b00e7dc5b64 SHA-1: 1cfe1dd58f0cf6b29cabf9aff5dd609adbc6ae00 SHA-256: 5b7142a23b456750048525c9258db2317b21174e906cfb5a3ae510801bd83784
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing' to view the content, which would activate the malicious object. This indicates a likely exploit delivery mechanism for initial compromise.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00005e86.bin
a43e6b2ea23ba4dfaa73ba9dad3d4efca293ae1b643561def27a7d83c79f1e1b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x5E86 1741 bytes