Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5b70445e393ab65b…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

108.5 KB
MD5: 521b98c483fadcf959bc3c5fa781c789 SHA-1: 12571fa5d4fc6a6495d862108b8da6c97adbf6ad SHA-256: 5b70445e393ab65bfaabb4ba5787671ddc958df86f026d6517ea87bc70f0b050
122 Risk Score

Malware Insights

The sample contains a high-confidence heuristic firing for CreateProcess API, indicating an attempt to launch an external process. The OLE document structure also shows significant slack space, which can be used to hide malicious content. While no explicit script was found, the CreateProcess reference strongly suggests the document's purpose is to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Office EPRINT stream contains EMF object high CVE related OLE_EPRINT_EMF_OBJECT
    OLE ObjectPool contains an EPRINT stream with EMF data. This is rare in normal documents and is CVE-2007-3893/MS07-046-family evidence when paired with Office exploit payload anomalies, but the malformed EMF record is not proven by this rule alone.
  • Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS
    Reference to CreateProcess API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 111,104 bytes but its declared streams total only 31,351 bytes — 79,753 bytes (72%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main