Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5b4162b11ddbe2c3…

MALICIOUS

PDF

67.3 KB Created: 2020-12-19 18:23:23 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-11-02
MD5: 4cd91536d2752b581a44dbf11099b081 SHA-1: 7462428dc85118e92b7d692bd83efc7db8f342db SHA-256: 5b4162b11ddbe2c35fc6bf2dc6164b15ceb184a9249fe0799de6c9798dada9fe
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains a large number of external links, many of which point to disposable hosting services, indicating a link farm designed to redirect users. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely for phishing or malware distribution. The embedded URLs and the heuristic findings of a 'PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM' and 'PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM' support this conclusion.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffset.ru/aws?utm_term=crafting+guide+runescape+free PDF link annotation
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369511/normal_5f9e26a027d47.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4489237/normal_5fd12d0ce8f42.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4376357/normal_5f9b241d35870.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4405181/normal_5fa56bd3879e9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4415065/normal_5fbbd48aec37f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://duvonejubuzal.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134321315/pirarebomefobe-mezuxuzipawolen-kekatenu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zavurebugefogoj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134397626/dilubatimo_xemoj_megakosonug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4418579/normal_5f98a50894031.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xekijepomi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134508866/xefapivudipili_mitoxadanav.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tumixivig.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131636813/kajiluwamigozux.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jumuwubugunitus.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070493/xepak.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://keniwuki.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131483234/vaxukekiwurefebe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4446507/normal_5fdd7d9288468.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4427780/normal_5fc5e626cd97a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000cab6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCAB6 5196 bytes
SHA-256: af737a339bbb55653636417704abe361a778745412ff66ef00b62136089f331b
font_01_sfnt_off0000dc75.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDC75 10664 bytes
SHA-256: 8ffd7fece68985bc1140003cd129e59ea978c63d45589c857b0bd1978bd98d73

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