MALICIOUS
430
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic
T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
T1059.003 Windows Command Shell
The sample contains VBA macros with an AutoOpen subroutine that utilizes Shell() and CreateObject() to download and execute a second-stage payload. The heuristic 'OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC' specifically indicates VBA downloading a file via HTTP and saving it to disk, which is then likely executed. The presence of cmd.exe references further supports the execution of downloaded content. The ClamAV detection 'Doc.Dropper.Agent-6412232-1' also aligns with this dropper behavior.
Heuristics 11
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Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELLShell() call in VBA
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VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXECVBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
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ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6412232-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6412232-1
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ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAVClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
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AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPENAutoOpen macro
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CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJCreateObject call
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cmd.exe reference in VBA high OLE_VBA_CMDcmd.exe reference in VBA
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VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXECCompiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
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VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBADocument contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
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External hyperlinks (2) low OOXML_EXTERNAL_HYPERLINKSDocument contains 2 external hyperlinks — clickable URLs are stored as external relationships. First target: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/videoplayer/embed/RE1FGlM
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://arsenal.30cm.tw/picaball.exe
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
- http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/videoplayer/embed/RE1FGlM
Extracted artifacts 2
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas982ec755929fc29fa0710599403527b768423e425c9bc2b964a39f22d9faa367 |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) | 4075 bytes |
vbaProject_00.binf19c57d1f57e44c7bd7204d63e9dd4690738b86d1075f235156b20014f71d05b |
vba-project | OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin | 15360 bytes |
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Detection
ClamAV:
Doc.Dropper.Agent-6412232-1
Obfuscation or payload:
unlikely
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