Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5b373348b65165ce…

MALICIOUS

PDF

63.8 KB Created: 2020-10-11 20:14:10 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-15
MD5: 5f815575ea805603ef9ff0b183a7af3d SHA-1: 6b3f8ec3785a7b28d3e74db4859a3555b6968a64 SHA-256: 5b373348b65165ce3d616c7a33ca1e6017cdb1c3dc6817801c428e3062eab724
234 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/strik?keyword=se+pode+hackear+facebook+com+ip In PDF document text
    • http://files.kokomozionumc.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131607544/vajonubimutadif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.steadfasttattoostudio.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380786/xorubedosopino.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fodarog.celltheon.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132814930/6848498.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1041068.mozfiles.com/files/1041068/kepugifi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1039658.mozfiles.com/files/1039658/riputexovetixazeribatuse.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037142.mozfiles.com/files/1037142/1614077286.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ba3e3f1f-3bbb-445f-a8b4-b34e6a3bd602/wibamijamewiwikovikawix.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d1510ea6-4931-4811-b6b2-7d92f215cbae/manasinezukeguritepovavej.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/40a40b69-f2e2-4b92-b46d-6abf39237549/sugimibikisezag.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/8d422107-742c-4491-b54d-aac85f3adfc4/pujojadipasevumemawem.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/30449e81-ebc6-4015-9246-7eee8e13f06e/89300140307.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/424cfda7-036c-452f-9d57-3c45760e1347/19953985055.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/de454857-1bd6-4e09-b782-50a1cdf95d47/18471109976.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/7a2d55ae-8eb5-4b1f-9bb3-a4815dbc6ba6/lubegavogi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000badf.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xBADF 5492 bytes
SHA-256: c7a8579eaeaa6c666e45c2953682e78b3ddc0355e3b1356c3e11fab27a76400c
font_01_sfnt_off0000cd68.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCD68 10732 bytes
SHA-256: 2102706703b084ca3a707ebcbe25082db34940bd212c48df62221537672ab1f7

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