Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5b2ea4654ae911c3…

MALICIOUS

PDF

82.7 KB Created: 2021-06-27 09:01:49 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: fdb46cc119af39b10c9fd83d858892b6 SHA-1: c5a23999023d81f71706b9320481e37560cccf05 SHA-256: 5b2ea4654ae911c3711193d268b06ca5c57fcd54984e437beb9fe6ffb2e07e11
164 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF file contains numerous links to compromised WordPress sites, suggesting it is part of a link farm designed to host malicious files. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely for phishing or malware distribution. The presence of multiple compromised CMS upload links points to a coordinated effort to distribute a payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9960

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.onlinetemsilci.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607de6c3836fb---saxixemimobilomokosegode.pdf
    • https://www.darrellstuckey.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16071ce9552d0d---dirurevufogas.pdf
    • http://grupogmec.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608d3193474b5---3877345534.pdf
    • https://www.lavishlook.se/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c9c670f77ee3b52135ab604a966e741e/83876137609.pdf
    • http://pck.malopolska.pl/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/60781aa82f42da05373de48c7402980f/26850811268.pdf
    • http://klingende-zeder.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a00fd64d216---44930577585.pdf
    • https://service-panev.com/userfiles/zunuparebomud.pdf
    • http://schouteninterieurwerk.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160955742150b9---57090079163.pdf
    • https://personalloan2u.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/1f08a9563df09e3d357cce0c0f02f53e/gotazoxiwaxategexisakanal.pdf
    • https://sdyh.gr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/crra1h61nva73qnfdanmun6177/72647527402.pdf
    • https://www.hotel-palladium.gr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/rcn0dcf4809lkt0r9fd4ve3c4v/ranupenurawufowevew.pdf
    • https://ottenburger.com/userfiles/file/91228807271.pdf
    • https://maxim-catering.de/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/h86sv1r8g3u1ponsbe4dbh86hf/timolokerobisiz.pdf
    • http://www.korayozelguvenlik.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bfaf5d56daa---5001050636.pdf
    • http://malagi.pl/user-files/fck/file/mavinukavuvitovib.pdf
    • https://arhometutor.com/userfiles/file/musuwurukasuxijimefim.pdf
    • https://www.pennlighting.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8e1c17b07a92dd6196f5787d0766f628/65388836092.pdf
    • https://www.eziblank.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/71cb7d5b708b1314c857a11037701c74/xegeduvukorodisubeganidar.pdf
    • http://kaizenlife.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/mewuwirofekumit.pdf
    • http://www.linkkorea.co.kr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c9e4c26bffb---fomiribigolivuxibijabe.pdf
    • https://promocionesnma.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f34888c6602cdd46a41e99f0eb9c0691/gebuzexexogetajusosizuzu.pdf
    • http://pileshoppen.dk/userfiles/file/vimareruviduwamis.pdf
    • https://www.tctnanotech.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/237ebf3e26028af39d1a6cdb77363e92/mijadafavizekabu.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/DOqCt-cVA4I/uplcv?utm_term=guitar+maniac+deluxe+4
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e150.bin
4dcb98aa629cfc003488165d3efa7e0a0eed494d24920ba5263e71f2ba05d962		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE150 17216 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00010ddd.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10DDD 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000125f4.bin
687c26bca1fb22b8e2a250627012f04ec1ae6145f3e3625054bb37565abb2d9c		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x125F4 10564 bytes

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