Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5b1ac6eea268f958…

MALICIOUS

PDF

39.4 KB Created: 2020-08-18 18:44:37 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: e99783be02c97af7a6324b30e5ee4c44 SHA-1: 9644e362e1807f6a4c3a4128246e170bc6668670 SHA-256: 5b1ac6eea268f9582d771ddd25649802f7e97c17c739b8aadb7fe2a2b86f38bf
192 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains a lure instructing the user to copy and paste content into a shell, likely to execute a second-stage payload. It also hosts a large number of external PDF links, many pointing to Shopify, suggesting a link farm or SEO manipulation tactic. The primary malicious URL identified is https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=ant++for+mac+os+x, which is flagged as a malicious redirector.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9986

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=ant++for+mac+os+x
    • http://files.ellennidanes.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606121/zemavezefu_tekogomubi.pdf
    • http://gotaka.nadaliejean.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132816066/51772294.pdf
    • http://milukaga.mohicounseling.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695366/cdeb7d60f093a.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/0622/9654/files/5973286772.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/0827/0244/files/dovebo.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/3048/5915/files/89453101953.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/9702/2871/files/dalafizejojinawewi.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/3337/9487/files/flower_names_list.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/0446/0188/files/nibubebubiwe.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/0660/7012/files/86916458069.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/1312/8867/files/lodaj.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/9302/5183/files/43411738848.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0443/5096/3868/files/12090601233.pdf
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005d18.bin
5c731f08acad3cb2cd450f8adee147e9e584759e511f1655d223a24d66491e26
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5D18 5052 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00006e2a.bin
b5a0f3fefb0e83b1c3c9fa5c95fc5618aa3f6bd1c8281b1f5407f3ba19fd523d
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6E2A 13832 bytes