Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5adb1e1e9f947ce1…

MALICIOUS

PDF

47.5 KB Created: 2020-07-16 03:04:42 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2026-05-09
MD5: f5d396b66565243496638630e2fadac3 SHA-1: fe8d31c99b61f246244c284642e3a3f5bb6eb80c SHA-256: 5adb1e1e9f947ce1cdc7b507cc1ca9d81f74a5146811ecfdcd378018eb037aff
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF file contains a large number of embedded links, with a critical heuristic identifying it as a malicious redirector link farm. Many of these links point to external PDF files hosted on various domains, suggesting an attempt to manipulate search engine results or distribute malicious content. The ML classifier also strongly flagged this PDF as malicious.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/wb?keyword=coupling%20alignment%20handbook%20pdf In PDF document text
    • http://files.outwesttechs.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070842/dudeta_kakuriri_zosozefupewoz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.aceremovalsbusiness.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814308/0c7c5e75274f20.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.dorebowen.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131607174/3994866.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.ccmooresville.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381819/tanupip.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fontawesome.iohttp://fontawesome.io/license/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://sediniguto.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/59223435775.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jiwuvef.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/sifevipoloki.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://solasuz.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/9672657131.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zidimamokad339045790.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/98534984404.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mivokalu.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/visudapitapapefugavop.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dumutifojut.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/tokeri.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://juzifak.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/46965584473.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://linujidiru785249151.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/64183176780.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/4865/7318/files/tesorowirufanaf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/7898/4614/files/digenexagewa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/78046530146.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/7292/9435/files/35797259703.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/23651487672.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/0718/0954/files/pejabab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000738e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x738E 1696 bytes
SHA-256: 0727529401fe802ed9d02ac4b3bed84f53da9d0a5838f1dab7fe2f7579417e88
font_01_sfnt_off00007bb8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7BB8 5288 bytes
SHA-256: acba2f779b719b30f2b99521531300cd3e244be2925eb0d60399f33eaf6dcf0c
font_02_sfnt_off00008d8f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8D8F 10264 bytes
SHA-256: 19b0ca78853ef671bcc5311928b28f543c950cc0e0578d716bf68ac28cdc1dfe