RTF malware analysis — malicious · 5aa719b2f05f47e8

MALICIOUS

RTF

105.6 KB First seen: 2024-09-27

MD5: 69504f46161b8e0834cb6394de6b99cf SHA-1: bc9959be5d513d90a22fd04038739d9c12593d8c SHA-256: 5aa719b2f05f47e85d68eb7d0d891bbdf19768d279b84f81466cbe2c564210dd

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample is an RTF document that contains an OLE object and triggers heuristics related to Equation Editor exploitation. The presence of \objupdate and \objautlink suggests that the embedded OLE object is designed to be activated automatically, leading to the execution of malicious code. This is a common technique for exploiting vulnerabilities like CVE-2017-11882 to download and execute further stages.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001e90.bin` `4e66e92ba3e890748e3e45d18299220fc87c1726c7353d2ef8f3096a3f755d88`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1E90	1990 bytes

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