Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5a9e09f978ee7d6e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

85.6 KB Created: 2021-04-28 01:23:10 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-29
MD5: 7ea3cc13e5ab2eee76ffba42ab3e4614 SHA-1: dab848fa782857521377c83992919661f97c5851 SHA-256: 5a9e09f978ee7d6e1abfc1cdff3bd355c1ebd3682616d582b64b877ff809bd52
304 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

This PDF file exhibits multiple high-risk indicators, including instructions to disable security software and to copy/paste content into command-line interfaces, suggesting an attempt to bypass defenses and execute a payload. The presence of password-protected archive lures further supports this, as it's a common tactic to hide malicious content from initial scanning. The file's structure and numerous links to potentially compromised WordPress sites indicate it's part of a phishing or malware distribution campaign.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 11

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Security software disable instruction high SE_SECURITY_BYPASS
    Document instructs the user to disable antivirus or security software — unusual for ordinary documents and high-risk in an unsolicited file
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://canvasations.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/jalonea4k5iu9v96mm3ufimat6/futojagotizus.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://www.thecandystoresudbury.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/a46hkhl9r6qt9kp9jnk245nmjl/pizutarifidaxakekom.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://imapcb.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/aep8gog4rlsnmls2auai6clug7/lunegetirogekulifud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ateneoarbonaida.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607de5a908b0a---69107626830.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ahcxdq.com/uploads/file/280546348488.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.viksexteriors.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606cc66a2f82e---55027436462.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://drmiamiconnect.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/a40175072e20c65cd872150d824bad5f/45454319289.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://104.156.58.56/~web2inbox/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160769a402a694---bupasilejefupesog.pdfPDF link annotation
    • https://dentinale.eu/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/27bf8ff57b7fa7a247275b6b09043246/viretufiwubi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.bridalchapel.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607da20ebd25c---35119179754.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xn--80ackbssfuieecff0e8c.xn--p1ai/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/edscumer0n0djls8obnj8g5o44/kedipozujawelonitixukibot.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://associacaoguainumbi.org.br/wp/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160797941c07a7---5992295838.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.modianodesign.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160806c3ae5d71---rozipuvagupedisafar.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ganan10.co.il/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160804bf17d07d---31879156708.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/Om9ozkHLxGw/uplcv?utm_term=kms+activator+windows+8.+1+64+bitPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • https://savannah.gnu.org/projects/freefont/In PDF document text
    • http://www.gnu.org/licenses/In PDF document text
    • http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f192.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF192 6440 bytes
SHA-256: 3d4760ca295192c89086870ebbac49c5a5945404ea6ab57fca452cf2db5f569a
font_01_sfnt_off00010186.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10186 5836 bytes
SHA-256: ef1ce0cb31c86c5c8dc109bc9cb49072633c74f69448a9a2e7b795e4179823b5
font_02_sfnt_off00011574.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11574 22328 bytes
SHA-256: f50f61bd54c0f63d8f3fbfae0d18e3711e2c69be6f9f7aba80e7aabd3dfe64c7

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.