Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5a97797c4799ec2f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

48.0 KB First seen: 2022-09-07
MD5: d99b3e51f0afcc934e98e781550ebd2b SHA-1: 68d33cffcd01ab04798b093bf1fd0d506b3321cb SHA-256: 5a97797c4799ec2fc5e4fa6c20f761fa9b5c4c37233500571eae816f6d2833df
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.001 Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.001 PowerShell

The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-0199 indicates the sample is designed to exploit a vulnerability in OLE linking to load a remote resource. The embedded URL points to a potential second-stage payload. The document is password-encrypted, a common tactic to hide malicious content and bypass basic inspection.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007+, AES-128)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://dummy_username@192.210.201.56/...--------.-------------------.._---_-----_-------/www_k/www.doc

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