Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5a6e6f5b8aa59099…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

32.4 KB Created: 2020-04-14 09:13:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: b95ba14c6dbb63db28018172e8cc9f23 SHA-1: 1fb21a749ff3acb2ccf1ecacb8e2146c5d49afbc SHA-256: 5a6e6f5b8aa590998182e29edec60c2fd36187114ab55e3fd7d627af562afd1f
250 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1071.001 Web Protocols T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The 'autoclose' macro, triggered upon closing the document, uses URLDownloadToFile to download a payload from an embedded URL. The document also displays a lure to enable macros, common for macro-based malware. The script attempts to save the downloaded file to the user's profile directory.

Heuristics 9

  • URLDownloadToFile in VBA critical OLE_VBA_DOWNLOAD
    URLDownloadToFile in VBA
  • Auto_Close macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOCLOSE
    Auto_Close macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • External relationship medium OOXML_EXTERNAL_REL
    External target in word/_rels/settings.xml.rels: new:13709620-C279-11CE-A49E-444553540000
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
4949c4d37fa2c403f0c8d4b298aa0e2c96389bc3c692d2beefe4b18c3134e220		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 885 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
d4504382bc99b0c630a567d1f38c59ce50fc033b70f1d180fa16fd3bb3bd62c0		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 9216 bytes

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