Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5a6786e89e9e81bc…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

79.3 KB Created: 2021-01-31 23:09:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: c2b19cac1c7811e1e28d91166330ef42 SHA-1: e8251f1f1aba94652bb9fcb4d9dd9195a364c188 SHA-256: 5a6786e89e9e81bc4d65b31322d9b05f21f095ce9d037c65842bde33246df281
224 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample contains a VBA macro with an AutoOpen subroutine that executes obfuscated code. This code reconstructs and executes a command line using cmd.exe to download a second-stage executable from 'http://apo.palen.club:2095/mand/pf05.exe' and save it as '%tmp%\snake.exe', which is then executed. This indicates a downloader or droppper functionality.

Heuristics 7

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
170780ce9a389fc64bb446ab48f453d6770236094da58016195cfa8f068b44cc		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1163 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
vbaProject_00.bin
916babd2210703a967e1bd2e2682cbca384c3d2da131bd4c36ef4f42c8a68297		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 15872 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.