Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5a3bf49296c7f96d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

42.9 KB Created: 2020-10-23 18:55:21 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-22
MD5: 9f8452aa3f98d5b07d7d7b833e87afd9 SHA-1: 21f6aab852492310e628eef958135ccaa2bfce95 SHA-256: 5a3bf49296c7f96ddab1c9332bbf7790b1b93ac09b42b34e4ab6adfc74410d9a
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to disposable hosting and redirector infrastructure, indicating a link farm designed to distribute malware or phish users. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains URLs that are also present in the heuristic findings, reinforcing the malicious intent. The ML classifier also strongly flagged this PDF as malicious.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.link/pify?keyword=ubc+vancouver+map+pdf In PDF document text
    • https://koxoganonigowup.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131408343/nepakupi-nozav-kikipunure-vazudimuridago.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bupiwuzisulim.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874125/532713.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vurofagulomefu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131452840/zisesozi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366408/normal_5f8ba4f49b173.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4365552/normal_5f86f66835f24.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4375210/normal_5f9205571e15a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369491/normal_5f88edad2b914.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4382430/normal_5f90ef0e6fb83.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pisekubil.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134322001/zibir.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lixaworone.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871871/2887594.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://guwomenod.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873843/nojof.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://razesupimo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815812/wexalewanalerim_dezozevusawe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://detopeda.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134305225/64cf066ab52f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4374372/normal_5f8ba8f119775.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4368752/normal_5f881b7a1df3b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0476/7481/8726/files/raxupubaret.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0500/4951/5684/files/makekixe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/090bc529-7e0d-4bb7-bea6-50dda05f4837/nulodabavibapizog.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/64718f6b-c401-4a2e-8554-6fe8a78831b1/monirovamanakidusez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000067e7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x67E7 5280 bytes
SHA-256: 0f00402c196b020087f09af39928c5ad6b03903f35fe13a1c644b2c8a21c03aa
font_01_sfnt_off000079d2.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x79D2 10920 bytes
SHA-256: 66d6941893cddb66d3d8e53b27fa58c3a8215289466d6ca7528b8f329d2459b8

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